

Certaine Letters
O F
HENRY IEANES
Minister of Gods word
A T
CHEDZOY.
A N D
DIEREMY TAYLOR
Concerning
A passage of his, in his
further
Explication of *Originall sin.*



OXFORD.

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*Dr Taylor in his further explication of the
doctrine of originall sin, pag. 496.*

THat every man is inclined to evill, some more, some lesse, but all in some instances; is very true: and it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sinne properly; 1: because that which is unavoidable is nota sinne; 2: because it is accidentall to nature, not intrinsicall, and essentiall; 3: It is superinduc'd to nature, and is after it, &c.

To



To the unprejudiced Reader.



shall only give thee a brieve narrative of the occasion of the ensuing letters: one Mr T. C. of Bridgwater being at my house, brake out into extraordinary, (that I say not excessive, and Hyperbolicall) praises of Dr Jeremy Taylor; I expressed my concurrence with him in great part; nay I came nothing behind him in the just commendations of his admirable wit, great parts, quick and elegant pen, his abilites in Criticall learning, and his profound skil in antiquity: but notwithstanding all this I professed my dissent from some of his opinions which I judged to be erroneous; and I instanced in his doctrine of originall sin, now his further explication of this lay then causually in the window (as I take it) which hereupon I took up, and turned unto the passage now under debate, and shewed unto Mr T. C. that therein was grosse nonsense, and blasphemy; he for his own part, with a great deale of modesty, forthwith declined all further dispute of the businesse, but withal he told me, that he would, if I so pleased, give Dr Taylor notice of what I said; whereunto I agreed, and in a short time he brought me from the Dr a faire, and civill invitation to send him my exceptions, and with it a promise of a candid reception of them; whereupon I drew them up in a letter unto Mr T. C. the Copy whereof followeth.

LET-

Letters of the Authour
And
D^r JEREMY TAYLOR
To M^r T.C.

Sir,



I have here, according unto your desire sent you my exceptions against that passage in Dr Taylor, concerning which you discoursed at my house; It is in his further explication of the Doctrine of originall sinne, page 496: and it is the second argument, which he brings to prove; that inclination to evill is *no sinne properly; because it is accidentall to nature*, not intrinsecall and essentiall. The argument put into forme may be reduced into two syllogismes.

The first.

Sinne properly is not accidentall to the nature of man.

An inclination to evill is accidentall to the nature of man: therefore

An inclination to evill is no sinne properly.

A second Syllogisme is.

Sinne properly so called is intrinsecall, and essentiall to the nature of man.

An inclination to evill is not intrinsecall, and essentiall to the nature of man: therefore,

An inclination to evill is not sinne properly so called.

Unto the first of those syllogismes; I answer that the major is false; and that according to Porphyry his so celebrated definition of an accident.

Accidens est quod adest, & abest sine subjecti intentione: that is, as the best Commentators upon Porphyry expound the words. An accident is that, which may be affirmed, or denied of it's subject; without any repugnancy, or contradiction to the essence, and definition thereof; now to deny sinne of man, gives no overthrow to his essence and definition, for a man that is no sinner may bee *animal rationale*; sinne therefore is accidentall to the nature of man.

The major of the second syllogisme is no lesse false, than that of the first, as for the terme, intrinsecall, I shall not stay upon it; because the Dr useth it as equivalent to essentiall; as is apparent by the Antithesis, he puts between it and accidentall; but shall wholly insist upon the word essentiall: To say, as the Dr doth by consequence, that sinne is essentiall to the nature of man, is an assertion, guilty of *nonsenses, Blasphemy, and libertinisme.*

D d d

1. Nonsense

1. *Nonsense.* A thing may be said to be essentiall unto an other, either *a priori*, and then it is predicated of it, *in primo modo dicendi per se*; or else *a posteriori*, and then it is predicated of it, *in secundo modo dicendi per se*. And to say that sinne is either of these wayes essentiall to the nature of man, is such pittifull, and prodigious nonsense, as that I cannot thinke it worthy of any serious refutation.

In a second place I charge it with Blasphemy: it blasphemeth three actions, three acts of God,

1. *The creation of man.* 2. *The incarnation of Christ.* 3. *The full glorification of the Saints at the resurrection.*

1. *The creation of man:* God was the Authour of whatsoever was essentiall unto man; And if sinne be essentiall unto the nature of man, then God was the Author of sinne.

2. *The incarnation of Christ:* in which God made Christ like unto man in essentials; If sinne then be essentiall unto the nature of man, God made Christ finfull; a blasphemy that I tremble to mention.

3. *This opinion blasphemeth God's full glorification of the Saints in the resurrection;* for it affirms by just consequence, that they shall be raised with sinne; because doubtlesse they shall be raised with whatsoever is essentiall to the nature of man.

In the third, and last place this Tenet is chargeable with libertinisme: 'Tis a licentious doctrine, and opens a gap to the greatest profanenesse; for it takes away all conscience of sinne, all repentance of it for the time past, all caution against it for the future: If sinne be essentiall to the nature of man, what reason hath he to be humbled for it? to aske God pardon for it? to make any scruple of the committing of it?

And thus having briefly performed my promise, and satisfied your request, I shall rest

Your affectionate freind,
and humble servant

HENRY JEANES.

Before the receipt of this, Mr T. C. gave an account unto Dr Taylor of what he remembered in our discourse, and received from him an answer, which he concealed from me untill the delivery of my paper, and then he produced it. This answer together with my reply thereunto I shall next offer unto thy Consideration.

To his respected Freind
Mr. T. C. these, &c.

Mr. C.

I thank you for your letter, and friendly information of Mr Jeanes his exception; but if he had been as carefull to understand as he was forward to object, and mistake, he had eased you, and me of this little trouble. He objects that I say, that inclination to sinne is no sinne, because it is accidentall, not intrinsecall, and essentiall; and he gives reasons why such a reason is absurd. To all which I returne this soft answer, that he says true, but nothing to the purpose. For the thing that I was to prove then, was the precedent word: [that every man is inclined to evill, some more, some lesse:] that is, that this inclination to evill is not regular and uniforme, and

and therefore not naturall, for as for the other clause] it is an effect or condition of nature, but no sinne properly] that was the lesse principall part of the proposition, and to it only the first reason was apportion'd, viz: [that which is unavoidable is not a sin.) But if he had considered the businesse I was then upon, he must needs have seen that I was explicating that clause of the Church Article [and is inclined to evil] which I was to say, was an inclination not naturall, not unaviseall, not essentiall; but accidental: and this thing I pursue, and to this all the other reasons relate to the end of that section, and none of them, the first only excepted, relates to the latter part of the proposition, which if I had left out, and the reasons relating to it, the sense had been as compleat, and my argument not the worse, and my discourse no lesse pertinent. And unlesse he refer the 4 last reasons, that is, all after the first to that clause of the variety of our inclination to evil, he will not only mistake the second reason, but all the rest. Besides this if Mr Jeanes had so much ingenuity as he pretends to have Logicke, he would have perceived that for me to meane, what he sayes I meane, had been the perfect destruction of all my discourse, and all my intention, for if I had sayd, that nothing could be a sinne; but what is intinscally and essentiall, then I had affirmed that not only some sinne, but all sinne had bene naturall. Now my Thesis being, that no sin, properly such, is naturall; it cannot be imagined that I should meane what he dreames of: it had not been to my purpose, either there or in the whole question. But all the following reasons do so explicate, and fully manifest the meaning of the second; that I wonder how Mr Jeanes if he be that person which he would be thought, could mistake, it, unlesse he be also that person he would not be thought: I could say many more things, but this being the truth of the businesse, and the reall purpose of my discourse, I need adde no more; but one thing I cannot but adde to Mr Jeanes, that is, since he instances in our B. Saviour, he must needs allow that concupiscence, taking it for those desires, which are purely naturall, and concreat with us, cannot possibly bee a sinne: Because as Mr Jeanes rightly observes, whatsoever is naturall to man, was in Christ, because he had all our mere nature, but he had not our sin; therefore, our mere nature hath no sin: for Christ was in all things like to us, sinne only excepted, but he took upon him our nature, and nothing of that was excepted; therefore our nature of it selfe is not properly sinfull: nothing of our constitution is criminall.

Sir, I have given you a faire and case answer. I pray let Mr Jeanes have so much conveyed to him, as concerns that part to which he objects: and if he writes any thing against me, let him take notice of this my answer, or else all the world shall take notice of his impertinent, and uningenious dealing: I pray let not this letter goe out of your hand, because I have no copy of it, if Mr Jeanes should be troublesome: But if he be, it will be sufficient to acquaint his neighbourhood with my defence, for what he sayes shall goe no farther. Sir, I hope you will expound this trouble I put you to in reading a long letter to my readinesse to doe you service, and as a returne of those great kindnesses by which you have obliged.

Sir,

Your very affectionate friend
to love and serve you
JER: TAYLOR.

London July 4th.

1657.

Postscript.

I hope I have spoken clearly enough in the explicating, and untwisting this knot in the bulrush; but if it be not extremely plaine, for your own satisfaction make but the second part of the proposition to be a Parenthesis; thus, beginning at (and it is an effect, &c: unto 2.) and then the thing is extremely plaine, (for there the designe was only to say and prove that although man be (more or lesse, as it happens) inclin'd to sinne, yet his nature is never the more criminall for that: for it is besides his nature, it is accidentall to it, not but that it is naturall to be inclin'd to such objects; but that this should be sinfull is but in some cases, and it is accidentall, and it is because those objects were forbidden after our nature was given to us. Men is naturally inclin'd to some things, which are not naturally, but accidentally sinfull.

To his Loving friend Mr
T. C. these &c.

Sir,
I have received Dr Taylor his letter sent unto you, bearing date July 4th. What designe you had in concealing of it so long from me I cannot guess. But if you had delivered it before I had sent you my objections, you would have eas'd me, and Dr Taylor of some trouble: for I should then have let alone these objections, and have only proved, that I did him no wrong, in charging him with the conclusions, against which these objections were directed; to wit, that no sinne is accidentall; that all sinne is essentiall, and irremissible.

Two things he layeth to my charge, want of care to understand him, and dissimulosity.

1. *Want of care to understand him.* [If he had been (he saith) as careful to understand as he was forward to object, and mistake, he had eas'd you, and me of this little trouble.] But if the Dr had been a man of that ingenuity, which you fame him for, he would have confessed his carelesnesse in expressing of himselfe, and not have charg'd me with want of care to understand, that to bee his meaning which I could not understand to bee his meaning without offering violence to his words: he proposeth two propositions (without any thing, but a copulative conjunction interposed betweene them) And unto the last of these propositions he subjoyneth 6 reasons. Now what rule of Logicke oblig'd me to cary the 5 last of these reasons backwards, and to place them between the above mentioned propositions, I readily confesse my selfe to be utterly ignorant, and shall be very ready to sit downe at the Doctor's feet, and to learne any such rule of him. If the Dr must have such liberty allowed him to make such unexampl'd transpositions, he is a very formidable adversary, not to be coped with by mortall wights, who cannot guess, how he will in an after game sever these reasons, that he hath first joyn'd together.

Logicke informeth me that secondly signifies a relation of order betwixt it selfe and firstly. But now if two reasons be related unto not one, but severall conclusions, I would faine know why one should be the first, and the other the second reason.

Besides

Besides here is a first reason, that hath no *second reason* following it, relating unto the same conclusion. There goeth a story of an *Alderman in Oxford*, that upon the reading of some records touching something controverted betwixt the Town, and University, he brake out into this expression; unless we can prove *King Henry* the 8th to be before *King Henry* the seventh the University will have the better of us: But if we can make it good, that *King Henry* the 8th was before *King Henry* the 7th, then there is no doubt, but that we shall in this particular have a full Conquest over the Schollars. I take this to be a fable: But however give me leave to make application of it unto my present purpose. All the wrong, that the Dr can pretend, that I have done him, is because I did not place *secondly* before *firstly*, and if he can make it good, that I ought to have placed *secondly* before *firstly*, then I must needs confesse I have done him a great deal of Injury, and shall be ready to aske his pardon; and unless such prooffe can be made, he must lay the blame upon the Confusion, and disorder of his own discourse: But to goe on. The Dr tels us, that this clause [*it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no fine property, is the lesse principall part of the proposition:*] both clauses then, according unto him, make but one proposition; and this is a great failing against that Logicke, which the learned have hitherto used; for by that, these two clauses are not parts of one proposition, but severall, intire, distinct propositions.

But perhaps he may say, that they make one compounded proposition.

Unto this I shall reply, 1. That a compounded proposition consists ever of simple propositions. Now the last of these clauses (to say nothing of the first) is a compounded proposition it selfe, for it is an adverbative proposition; and therefore, though these two clauses may make an aggregation of severall propositions, yet they can never concur to the Composition of one.

2. If both clauses make one compounded proposition, then it is a *copulative* proposition; because they are knit together by a copulative conjunction; Now a copulative proposition is not true, unless all parts be true; and consequently it is not proved to be true, unless all parts be proved to be true: Now the Doctor for the prooffe of this pretended copulative proposition jumbleth together 6 reasons without any note of distinction to direct the Reader, unto which part of the proposition (as he calls it) he should apply the severall reasons: and whether this prooffe of a copulative proposition be not illog call, I appeale unto any man, that knowes any thing in Logicke.

He informes you, that the first reason is appoynted to be unto the latter part of the proposition (as he calls it) and the 5 other reasons unto the first part of the proposition. But what precept of Logicke, or Grammar I have transgressed in not making such a distribution, or application of his reasons, he doth not acquaint you.

But the Doctor directs you unto *two wayes* for the finding out of his meaning. The *First* to leave out the second clause, and the reason relating unto it. If I had (saith he) left out the latter part of the proposition, and the reasons relating to it, my sense had been as compleat, and my argument not the worse, and my discourse no lesse pertinent.

But the second clause being left in, perturbeth, and confoundeth the sense, and occasioneth the mistake: and who (I pray) is to be blamed, the Dr for putting it into the *Synthesis*, or I for still keeping it in the Analysis of his words? It would be a strange, and unheard of way of analysing, that a Reader should loppe off two lines at a time of an author: But it should seeme wee are to make such

defalcations to make your great Dr speake sense; only I would know by what warrant, and obligation.

A *second way*, which will make it extremely plaine (as he tels you in the postscript) is to make the second part of the proposition (as he termes it) and the reason relating unto it to be a *Parenthesis*.

But, 1. that this was not brought in by way of Parenthesis, who is in the fault?

Again, 2. The Dr hath told us, that it is the second part of the same proposition with the foregoing clause, and, if so, then it cannot be inserted as a Parenthesis betwixt it, and the following proposition.

And besides, 3. If he bring in the words *only by way of Parenthesis*, I would faine know what is to be done with *ely*, in this case he must new figure, and number his reasons. That which he figureth to be the second reason, must be the first, and his six reasons will prove to be but five.

The second thing that he chargeth me with is disingenuity. *Besides this* (saith he) *if Mr Jeanes had so much ingenuity, as he pretends to have Logicke, he would have perceived, &c.*

for 1. As what he speaks of my pretending unto Logicke, I thinke unworthy of any answer, and shall leave it unto the Reader to judge of the wit, and ingenuity thereof.

2. It is no disingenuous part in me to charge the Dr with a conclusion, that I prove his words to be guilty of: For as for his meaning, I cannot guesse at it, but by his words, but I believe the unpartially Reader, will judge it a very high point of disingenuity in the Dr, not to acknowledge the incommodious structure of his words.

But let us heare wherein my disingenuity consists, *If Mr Jeanes* (saith he) *had so much ingenuity as he pretends to have Logicke, he would have perceived that for me to meane, what he sayes I meane, had been the perfect destruction of all my discourse, and all my intention.*

If this be all; The Dr hath no reason to charge me with want of ingenuity in this particular; for I doe very well perceive, that for him to meane, what I say, his words hold forth (for as for any secret, and reserved meaning, I have nothing to doe with) had been the perfect destruction of all his discourse, &c. But I believe the Doctors meaning is, that it is an ingenuous part in me to think it possible, or probable for him to assert any thing, that is the perfect destruction of all his discourse, and all his intention. Now this I utterly deny. I have no such apprehension of the Doctor's infallibility; but take him to be a man as likely to contradict himselfe, as other mortals.

There is one thing more, that the Dr add's concerning our blessed Saviour, that concupiscence taking it for those desires, which are purely naturall, and concreated is no sinne, because it was in Christ.

Unto which I answer that this is nothing unto the purpose; for the concupiscence in controversy is preternaturall, and never created, or concreated by God.

It is an inclination unto evill; and therefore irregular, and disorderly: it is that which the Apostle termeth, *the sin, that dwelleth in him*, Rom. 7. 17: *which made him doe that evill, which he would not*, vers: 19: *which he hated*, vers: 15. *The law of his members warring against the law of his mind*, vers: 23: *the body of this death, from which he desired to be delivered*, vers: 24: And (methinks) he should

should be afraid to ascribe this concupiscence unto Jesus Christ, who was the Lambe of God without blemish, and without spot, 1 Pet. 1. 19: holy, harmlesse, undefiled, separate from sinners, Heb. 7. 26: And thus I have according unto the Doctor's desire, taken notice of his answer, and shall not be so hasty as to write any thing against him, but that I shall stay a convenient time to heare the uttermost, that he can say; and when our Paper shall be made publicke unto all the World, I doe not doubt but there will be more that will accuse him of incogitancy, than me of impertinency. Many ingenious and learned men, and some, that otherwise admire the Dr, have made the same construction of his words, that I have, and thought that, he here forgot himselfe. I am informed that the Dr in a letter unto you, tels you, that he desires not to bee troubled with my trifling Logicke, I hope he reviles not Logicke as trifling, for then I know in what herd of writers to ranke him, and should decline him as an irrationall adversary, who is an enemy to the very art of reason.

But it is not Logicke it selfe I believe, but my Logicke, that he thus bespatters: and if it be so, I shall returne nothing unto this his censure, but leave you, and others his admirers to judge of the humility, and ingenuity thereof.

I have heard that the Dr hath printed a very good Grammar, if he will also publish a Logicke, for the better information of such triflers as my selfe, I doe assure you, that I will very diligently peruse it, and if it be more solid, weighty, and serious, than those which I have hitherto read, give him many thanks for it.

As for his last letter, I have not yet had the leisure fully to peruse it, but by that cursory view which I have taken of it, I find it to be as empty of reason, (though fuller of passion) as the former: you have given it out that it is unanswerable; but I shall desire you to have a little patience, and if I doe not give it a satisfying answer, I shall submit unto what penance you will injoyne me. In great hast I rest.

Your affectionate friend,

and servant,

HENRY JEANES.

Chedzey August 31.

1657.

Mr C. thought, that the Doctor's letter would supersede all further disputation; but perceiving that I was unsatisfied, and that I intended a replication, he conveyed my objections unto the Doctor, which begat a very angry letter from him; unto which he would not vouchsafe so much as a superscription; but I saw the Contents concerned me, and therefore unto thee I shall present it, together with my answer thereunto, submitting both unto thy censure, and so shall rest

Devoted to thy spirituall service

HENRY JEANES.

Sir,

I understand by my very good friend Mr T. C. that you are very much troubled at a passage in my [further explication of originall sin] pag: 496: The words are these [that every man is inclined to evill. some more, some lesse, but all in some instances, is very true, and it is an effect, or condition of nature; but no sinne properly.] The offence you conceive is because, one of the reasons I bring to prove it is, because it is accidentall to nature, not intrinsecall and essentiall.]

upon

upon this you fancy that I intend that all *finne* is *intrinsicall* and *essentiall* to nature; which indeed if I had said, I had been as very a fool as you conceive me, and worse; for besides the reasons you are pleas'd to object, which I am no way by this concern'd to examine, I had destroy'd my maine intention nay, that which I was proving in that very place; for my worke there was to prove that no *finne* is, or can be *naturall*.

Now then although I know you could easily have understood what I did and must mean there; yet because you are pleas'd not to doe it; I will point in out to you. To be inclin'd to evill is an effect or condition of nature; but no *finne* properly, viz: of nature; for that is the subject of the Question: whether inclination to evill be an effect of nature, or an inherent principle of evill; a *finne* *naturall* and necessary. Now that it is not this; I doe suppose that reason, which you so misconstrued competent: viz: It is not a *naturall* or necessary *finne*, not a *finne* of our nature, because it is *accidentall* to nature, not *intrinsicall*, not *essentiall*; If it be in our nature, it must be *naturall* inseparable, it must be at first, it must be in all persons, that have our nature. And this is my meaning; and that you may not be troubled at the word *essentiall*; I mean it not in the strict *physicall*, but in the *moral* sense; that which is not after our nature, but together with it in *reall* being; and I explicate it, by *intrinsicall*; I oppose it to *accidentall*; (in this reason) and to [*superinduc'd*] in the next. Sir I did give an account to Mr C. in a letter to him, which I know was sufficient, and *causae*; for cuius est loqui, ejus est interpretari; I told you perfectly what is my meaning, it is very plain: by the whole designe of that, that it must be my meaning; it is also cleare enough an every way in the expression, and therefore I now appeale to your ingenuity, whether you ought to have made such tragedies with that which common sense would have made plaine to you, unlesse you had received a prejudice.

And now Sir, to your two syllogismes, be pleas'd to the subject of the two majors, to adde but this qualification; [*naturall*] and try if those horrid consequents will follow which you affixed to your own *carapularum*.

But I shal for this once consider the particulars.

1. You charge it with nonsense; but with your favour you prove it most pitifully, your reason is, that to say [*essentiall*] is predicated of (*sin*) in either of the two ways, di-cendi per se, is such pitifull and prodigious nonsense, that you thinke it not worthy of any serious refutation; so that this is your argument [to say that *sin* is *essentiall* is prodigious and pitifull nonsense; g. it is prodigious and pitifull nonsense] surely a good argument; or thus, that which is such nonsense that you thinke not worthy of refutation, is certainly nonsense: but to say that *finne* is *essentiall* is such nonsense that you thinke not worthy of refute: therefore it is nonsense. I doe not say your argument is nonsense, but I am sure it is no argument, unlesse a bold affirmative be a sufficient proove in your Logick. But to the thing that *finne* is *essentiall*, is indeed false to say, but to say so, is not nonsense. And whereas you will suppose me to say so, you are uncharitable, and something unreasonable in it: for I was to prove that inclination to *finne*, was not a *finne* of our nature (as was pretended), because what was *naturall*, is *intrinsicall* and *essentiall*, as docib-ility to nature; which becaise to be inclin'd to *finne* is not, g. it is not a *si* n, viz: of nature.

In the next place you charge this with blasphemy If I had said or meant what you pretend; you had reason. But then pray consider how your charge will retorne really upon your selfe. For if it be blasphemy to ascribe God to be the Author of *finne*; then what I deriv'd from Adam is no *finne*, for that Adam's *finne* should descend upon me, I demand, who was the Author of that? If you please you may take time to consider it; but in the interim, if you be pleas'd to read a little discourse of mine called *Deus* *justifica-*
tus,

us, you shall find my Question not to be answered by you, if you have any regard to the authority, or to the reason of Mr Calvin, Dr Twisse, and some other Bigots of your party. Your second charge of Blasphemy, is that my reason does by implication impute to Christ in the guilt of sinne; because whatsoever is essentiall he had. But then if you remember, that I say not, that sinne is essentiall; and that I bring the reverse of this very argument against your party and opinion in some of my late discourses, you have reason to shut the fire out of your owne bosome, not to tell me, that I blaspheme. For if inclination to sinne be a sinne naturally, and derived from our Parents, I demand whether or no had not Christ all naturall desires? If he had not, he was not a perfect man. If he had then all naturall desire: are not naturall sins, for if you say they be you are the blasphemer by the consequence of your affirmative; not I: But God forbid that either of us should. Your third reason also is as pretty. For first I demand whether a possibility to sinne be not of the nature of man (for that is all I mean by essentiall.) If it be not; how came Adam to sinne his first sine? If it be; I aske whether shall the Saints in the resurrection be raised up with it or no? If yea, then you blaspheme Gods full glorification of the Saints in the resurrection, for impeccability is certainly a part of their full glorification; If nay, then it is no blasphemy to say that in the resurrection the Saints shall be raised up without something that is essentiall to them, or of their nature. But Sir, what thinke you of mortality? is that essentiall, or of the nature of man? I suppose you will not deny it. But yet I also believe you will confesse that though we are some a corruptible body, yet we shall be raised up incorruptible; and the mortall shall put on immortality. Once more, is it naturall to be naturall that will not be denied; but then remember that although to be naturall is essentiall, that is, of the essence of the body, yet the natural body shall rise without it's naturall; it is some a natural body, it is raised a spirituall. So that you see if I had said this which you charge upon me, which is so contrary to my thoughts, and so against my purpose, yet your arguments could not have overthrowne it. It is good advice, ἐγὼ τὴν ἐν ἑσέων πρὶν ἀνελθόν. If you had been pleased to have learn'd my meaning, before you had published your dislike, I should have esteemed my selfe oblig'd to you in a great acknowledgment: now you have said very much evill of me, though I deserve'd it not. For suppose I had not prosperously enough express'd my meaning; yet you who are a man of wit and parts could easily have discerned my purpose and my designe, you could not but know and consider too, that my great designe was to say, that sinne could not be naturall; that it is so far from being essentiall, that it is not so much as subject'd in our common nature, but in our persons only. But beside this Sir, I am a little to complaine of you, that when you had two words at your choice to explicate each other, (intrinsecall and essentiall) you would take the hardest and the worst sense, not the easiest and most ready: for you cannot but know that (essentiall) is not alwayes to be taken in the strictest sense of Philosophy; for that which is constitutive of a nature, but largely and for all sorts of proprieties, and the universall accidents of nature; as it is essentiall to man to laugh, to be capable of learning, to be mortall, to have a body of contrary qualities, and consequently by nature corruptible; and in a morall discourse to call for metaphysicall significations, and not to be content with morall and generall, nor proceed from an itch to quarrel, but not from that ingenuity which will be your and my best ornament.

Although I have not much to doe with it, yet because you are so great a Logician, and so great an admirer of that, which everyone of your Pupils knowes I mean, Prophets definition of an accident: I care not if I tell you, that the definition is imperfect and false, it is not convertible with the Definitum. For even essentiall things may be taken away, sine interitu subjecti. I instance: to be quantitative, is essentiall to a body, and to

have successions of duration; but yet in the resurrection, when bodies shall be spiritual and eternal, those other which are now Essential predicates shall be taken away, and yet the subject remain, and be improv'd to higher and more noble predicates. This I have here set down, not that I at all value the problem whether it be so or no; but that you may not think me a Socinian particularly in this Article, or that I think the bodies in the resurrection shall be specifically distinct from what they are: I believe them the same bodies, but enabled in their very beings: For to a specific and substantial change, is required that there be an introduction of new forms; but yet the improving of Essential predicates, is no specification of subjects, but melioration of the first: But the consequent is, that abesse, & adesse, &c. is not an excellent definition of an accident. And yet further, it follows, That if sin were as essential to a man, as mortality is, or to be quantitative, yet there is no more need that a man should rise with sin, then with mortality: But Aristotles Philosophy, and Porphyries Commentary, are but ill measures in Theology; and you shou'd do well to scowle bright that armor in which you trust, which unless it be prudently conducted, it will make a man a Sophister, rather then a Theologues; but you are wiser. I have only this one thing to adde, That the common discourses of Original sin, make sin to be natural, necessary and unavoidable; and then may not I use your own words? This Tenet is chargeable with Libertinism: It is a Licentious Doctrine, and opens a gap to the greatest prophaneness: For it takes away all conscience of sin, all repentance of it for the time past. If sin be natural, necessary, and unavoidable, as it is to us, if we derive it from Adam, &c. What reason hath he to be humbled for it, and to ask God pardon for it? so that you have done well against your own Opinion; and if I had not used the argument before, I should have had reason to thank you for it: Now as it is, you are further to consider it, not I. Sir, Though I have reason to give you the priority in every thing else, yet in civility I have far out-don you: You were offended at a passage, which you might easily, but wou'd not understand: You have myed arguments against me, which return upon your own head: The Proposition you charge me withal, I own not in any of your senses, nor (as you set it down) in any at all; and yet your Arguments do not substantially or rationally confute it, if I had said so: Besides all this, you have used your pleasure upon me, you have revild me, slighted me, scorn'd me, untampered, unprovoked: you never sent to me civilly to give you satisfaction in your objection: but talk'd it in my absence, and to my prejudice; yet I have sent you an answer, I hope satisfactory, and together with it a long Letter, which in the midst of my many affairs, and straitened condition, is more then I can again afford: And after all this, I assure you that I will pray for you, and speak such good things of you, as I can spare, or bear to be in you, and profess myself, and really be,

August 15,
1657.

Sir, Your affectionate Friend and Servant in our
blest Lord and Saviour Jesus.

Jer: Taylor.

Postscript.

Postscript.

Sir, I received yours late last night, and I have returned you this, early this morning, that I might in every thing be respective of you; but I desire not to be troubled with any thing that is not very material; for I have business of much greater concernment; neither can I draw the saw of contention with any man about things less pertinent. I expect no answer, I need none, I desire none; but expect that you will employ your good parts in any thing rather, than in being ingenious in alieno Libro: Your talents can better (if you please) serve God, than by cavelling with, or without reason.

To the Reverend and Learned, Dr. Jeremy Taylor.

S I R.

W Hat you mean, by my being very much troubled at a passage in your further Explication of Original Sin, I know not; Indeed I exprest unto Mr. T. C. my dislike of it, and charged it with nonsense and Blasphemy: And this charge I have proved; and now shall briefly vindicate the proof of it, from your Reply in this my Rejoynder. You tell me, that your work in that very place, is to prove, That no sin is, or can be natural: Now I cannot finde any thing sound- ing that way within forty lines of these words; and that it was my duty to look fur- ther for the Coherence of them, I confess, I knew not. Another great mistake al- so, it seems I have committed; in that I have not so high thoughts of you, as to think it impossible, or very unlikely, that you should be so uncautalous as to drop any contradiction unto your main intention: And this is an error that I can hardly shake off as yet; but I do assure you, that I shall endeavour to have as reverend an opinion of you as I possibly can; onely, I shall never exempt you from a possibility of erring: never think that you sit upon a Chair made of Irish Timber, that can- not endure a venomous Spider to hang his web thereon. I shall, for that which followeth, insert the words of your Letter verbatim, that the Reader may the better compare them and my answer together.

Dr. Taylor.

Now although I know you could easily have understood what I did, and must mean there; yet, because you are pleased not to do it, I shall point it to you.

James.

I wonder why you should think it so easie a matter to understand your meaning, seeing you, who are the Author, differ from your self in assigning what it is; for in your Letter unto Mr. C. you apportion'd this second Reason solely unto the first Clause; That every man is inclined to evil, some more, some less, but all, in some in- stances is very true: And here in your Letter to me, you apply it unto the second Clause: It is an effect or condition of nature, but no sin properly. Suppose I were at a loss, yet you have no reason to blame me, until you agree with your self: I have no Spectacles to look into your meaning, but your words, and that they were relat- ed onely unto one Proposition, as a reason thereof; and yet related to two Propo- sitions, as a proof of each, was a thing that I could never possibly divine, nor

cannot yet understand; and herein, I am afraid, you are as unable to teach me how this can be, as I am incapable of learning; but if you can teach any such thing unto me, you shall finde me, though perhaps not an apt, yet a willing and thankful Scholar: But to deal plainly with you, I am very confident that your words in themselves hold forth neither of those senses that you propound; and if by dint of argument you can prove either of them from your words, you shall have my most penitent and submissive confession of my mistake, and shall have full leave to prescribe me as publick and shameful a satisfaction, as you can think on; unto which, I do promise to conform my self. But let us hear how you point out your meaning to me.

Dr. Taylor.

Yet because you are pleased not to understand what I did, and must mend there, I will point it out to you: To be inclined to evil, is an effect or condition of nature, but no sin properly, viz. of nature; for that is the subject of the question, whether inclination unto evil be an effect of nature, or an inherent principle of evil; a sin natural and necessary? Now that it is not this, I do suppose that reason, which you so misconstrued, competent, viz. it is not a natural, or necessary sin, not a sin of our nature, because it is accidental to nature, not intrinsic, not essential.

Finnes.

To rescue your second reason from that which I charge it with, you are fain to make an additional supply unto the Proposition; unto which, you say, your second reason is competent. To be inclined to evil, &c. is no sin properly, no natural and necessary sin, no inherent Principle of evil. Now unto this addition I shall apply your words that you have concerning *Bianus* and *Baxonus* in the like case; whether it may be allowed you by any sense, less then Poetical, let Criticske judge: Surely, Sir, if the most of your Writings be thus elliptical, they will be unintelligible unto me without a Commentary, and if you must be indulged the liberty of making such interpolations, all the Universities in Christendom are no match to dispute with you.

But to insist a little upon the examination of this Interpolation.

1. You seem to make equivalent these two propositions; *Inclination to evil, is an inherent principle of evil*; *Inclination to evil, is a sin natural and necessary*: But I am utterly unsatisfied touching this their equivalency, and shall desire you to clear it up unto me.

Nay further, I very much question the truth of the first Proposition; *this inclination to evil, is not an inherent principle of evil*; and shall intreat you to inform me, whether you deny it to be a principle of evil, or an inherent principle, and think it only adherent, circumstantial, or the like: but I believe you will tell me of some Ellipsis in your words, that I ought to understand, and supply something to make out your sense: What it is, I will not adventure to guess at, but leave it to you to express it your self.

Secondly, The conclusion that is confirmed by your second Reason, is the same with that which is proved by your first Reason; and that was, that inclination to evil was no sin, without the additional Epithets of *natural and necessary*. It is no sin, say you, properly; because, that which is unavoidable, is no sin: and indeed, the unavoidableness of our inclination to evil, may be a probable argument that it is no sin,

fin, and require an answer ; but no competent reason at all to prove it not to be natural and necessary : But seeing you say, it must be your meaning that these Epithets should be interposed, we will for once suppose it, for Disputation sake, and see whether we can understand by any means what you would have.

1. You say, your meaning in your conclusion is, that *inclination to evil is no sin, viz. of nature*, which I shall consider anon, when I shall come to examine that subtilty of yours, *That sin is not so much as subjected in our common nature.*

2. Let us inquire what you mean by *natural and necessary.*

1. What you mean by *natural* : There be divers significations of the word natural, which are impertinent to our present Discourse, and therefore I shall omit them, I suppose that you take natural, either for that, which is so termed, *in regard of connexion with our nature* ; or else in respect of *Physical, and necessary resultancy from our nature.*

If you take it for that, which is so termed, *in regard of connexion with our nature*, which is coeval with our nature, derived unto us in the Nativity and Conception of our nature, then your *second Reason* is Tautological, a most pitifull and miserable begging of the question, for you tell us afterward, that by essential, you mean that *which is not after our nature, but together with it* in real being ; and then, there will be no more difference betwixt essential and natural, in this acceptation of it, then there is betwixt *ensis* and *gladius*, and so your Argument explained will stand thus.

Inclination to evil is not connexed with our nature ; because it is not connexed with our nature : it is not coeval with our nature, derived unto us in the Conception and Nativity of our nature ; because it is after our nature, and not together with it in real being.

2. If you take natural, *in regard of necessary resultancy from our nature* ; then your Argument is impertinent, and concerns not those whom you oppose ; for they deny, as well as you, that inclination unto evil is natural in such a sense : Let two speak for all.

First, *Bishop Davenant* in his Determinations, where his determination of the sixteenth Question, is, *Probitas ad malum non fuit ex principijs naturæ integræ.*

The second is *Dr. Baro* in his Metaphysics, pag. 255. *Theologi nostri asserunt, concupiscentiam aut'o modo esse quid necessario consequens naturam humanam in se spectatam ; & ideo dicunt eam esse quid superadditum, & adventitium, in animo hominis existens post 'apsum.*

But perhaps you may pitch upon some other acceptation of natural ; if you do, I shall beseech you not to chide me, but to certify my mistake by explication of your meaning ; for I have done my best to bolt it out, and must needs profess, that I cannot guess at any other signification of natural, which you can here in this place with any probability pretend unto : But if you can acquaint me with any other, when I know it, I shall be ready to examine it.

But to proceed unto the next Epithete *necessary* : When you said, that an inclination to evil was not properly a sin, your meaning was (you say) that it was not a necessary sin.

But then I desire to know how your first Reason will be suited unto this conclusion, for your first Reason stands thus, because that which is unavoidable, is not sin ; and I would intreat you also to inform us, what is the difference here betwixt necessary and unavoidable ; for if there be no difference, I shall shrewdly suspect your arguments sick of that infirmity, called *petitio principii.*

But

But perhaps we must here make the like supply, and understand you thus, because that which is unavoidable is not a necessary sin; if so, your Argument reduced unto form, will run thus.

Nothing that is unavoidable can be a necessary sin: But an inclination to evil is unavoidable: Therefore it is not a necessary sin.

Unto your major I say, that though unavoidableness, in one sense, may carry a repugnancy unto sin, yet not to necessary; it may prove a thing not to be a sin, but it makes nothing against its being necessary; for that which is unavoidable, may be, and is necessary; it is probable therefore, that necessary was never in your first thoughts, but put in, to secure your second Reason from mine Objections against it.

However, yet I shall here propound and apply a distinction of necessary, usual Dr. Edw: among your Antagonists: * A thing, say they, may be said to be necessary, in regard of either *primitive and created*, or *consequent and contracted necessity*. Reynolds 3 Treatises, page: 209.

If you speak of that, which is necessary with that necessity, which is *primitive and created*, then indeed I grant your conclusion true, and your second reason competent unto it: Inclination unto evil is not a necessary sin, in regard of a Primitive and Created necessity.

But now this were utterly besides the main of your intention, for here you would fight with nothing but your own shadow, because your adversaries do not avouch such a necessity in our inclination to evil, but despise and abhor it more than your self; and you cannot affix any such thing unto them, unless you grossly calumniate them.

If you speak of that which is necessary, with a *consequent and contracted necessity*; then your conclusion is false, and your second reason no confirmation thereof; if it be put into form, it will make up two Syllogisms.

The first Syllogism.

Nothing that is accidental, can be a sin necessary, with a consequent and contracted necessity.

But our inclination to evil is accidental.

Therefore it is not a necessary sin in respect of a consequent and contracted necessity.

The second Syllogism.

Every thing that is necessary in respect of a consequent and contracted necessity, is intrinsecal and essential.

But inclination to evil is not intrinsecal and essential.

Therefore it is not necessary, in regard of a consequent and contracted necessity.

The major in both Syllogisms is evidently false, as will appear, when you attempt the proof of them: and I am very confident, you never will own them, if you can any other way shift off my objections.

In the next place, we have a strange Paradox of yours, which I understand not, I shall propound it, and briefly consider it.

Dr. Taylor.

If it be in our nature, it must be naturally inseparable, it must be at first, it must be in all persons that have our nature.

James.

James.

I shall not peremptorily charge this Proposition with falshood, until I know how you explicate it, and yet I will tell you what reason I have to suspect it to be very false; divers accidents are in our nature, properly and strictly inherent in our nature, which yet are naturally separable from our nature, which were not at first, which are not now in all persons that have our nature: I might instance in several acquired habits, and immanent acts of the rational soul, which are neither adequate unto, nor coeval with, nor naturally inseparable from it.

But I look for some strange Ellipsis; a Rhetorical Scheme it seems you are much delighted with; but if you use it too often, it will prove rather a Weed, then a Flower in your Rhetorick; you expect, it seems, I should pay such reverence unto your Writings, as great Criticks do unto the Ancients, in whose words, when they cannot make sense, they suppose some *Chasma* to fill up, with which they torture their brains; but I have something else to do, then to trouble my self with Divinations at your meaning: when you vouchsafe to acquaint us what it is, I shall then examine it.

But having seen how ill you have sped in new shaping your conclusion, let us see next whether your success be better in the qualification of your second reason for it.

Dr. Taylor.

And this is my meaning, and that you may not be troubled at the word Essential; I mean it not in the strict Physical, but in the moral sense, that which is not after our nature, but together with it in real being, and explicate it by extrinsic; and I oppose it to accidental in this reason, and to superinduc'd in the next.

James.

But first, pray who could tell that you thus meant it, until you now tell me: Is this a usual and received sense of the word? and if it be, direct me unto those moral Philosophers and Divines, that thus take it; if it be not, my ignorance of it is *privæ negationis*, not *privæ dispositionis*, not privative and blameable: *Analogum per se positum stat pro famosiore Analogato*; and therefore I appeal unto your own ingenuity, whether I have injured you, by supposing that you took Essential in the accustomed acception thereof.

2. I shall beseech you to set down the difference that you make betwixt natural in your conclusion, and essential in your second reason for it; and when you have done this, I am very confident to make it appear, that your Argument is either a mere tautology, or an utter impertinency; but of this before.

Next you refer me unto your former Letter unto Mr. C.

Dr. Taylor.

Sir, I did give an account unto Mr. C. in a Letter to him, which I know was sufficient, and æquâ civis.

James.

The vanity of this brag you will soon acknowledge, when you shall compare that Letter with this unto me; for in this you apply the second reason unto the latter clause

as a congruent proof; it it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly: And this you point out to be your meaning, and say, That I could easily have understood it: But in your Letter to Mr. C. you aver, that this second reason is applicable only unto the first clause; That every man is inclin'd to evil, some more, some less, &c. and not at all unto the second; nay, that it is not applicable unto it, without a mistake of not onely the second, but the four other reasons also; and of this too, you say that it must be your meaning, and that 'tis clear enough, and easie in the expression; and you wonder that Mr. *Jaues*, if he be the man, that he would be thought could mistake it: Here you propound inconsistent and contrary meanings, and it seems you intend to tie me unto such hard meat, as that I must find out each to be your meaning; but this is a task, that my understanding cannot perform, and therefore I shall beg assistance from the light and learning of yours: and until you afford this, I shall offer unto your consideration this common rule in Logicks, That contrary propositions cannot be both true, but one of them must needs be false: But these two propositions, this second reason is referred unto the second clause, as a competent proof, and this second reason is not referred unto the second clause, are contrary propositions; the opposition betwixt singular propositions, being, as *Scheibler* well sheweth, de prop. cap. 11. num. 18. most aptly reducible unto contrariety; and yet both these propositions are yours, the first in this letter, the latter in your former letter, and therefore one of them must needs be false; you are not then so much *ex celis*, extra telli jactum, out of Gun-shot, but that my poor trifling Logicks is able to reach you: if you should deny the matter of Fact, that both these propositions are yours, your letters will convince you of untruth, and I shall need no more then to transcribe your own words: The first Proposition you have in these words of this Letter, To be inclin'd to evil, is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly, viz. of nature, &c. a sin natural and necessary; now that it is not this, I do suppose that reason, which you so misconstrued, is competent, &c. The second, in several passages of your former Letter; as for the other clause, it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly, that was the less principal part of the Proposition, and to it onely the first reason was apportioned; and again afterward, none of the other reasons, the first onely excepted, relate to the latter part of the Proposition: But let us hear your reason for the sufficiency of your Letter unto Mr. C.

Dr. Taylor.

For cuius est loqui, ejus est interpretari.

Jeanes.

I shall willingly grant you all fair liberty of interpreting your self, so you do it logically and rationally; but that which you expect, is rather a licentiousness, then a true liberty of interpretation.

First, You would have a license of transposition, to carry your words where you please; you would have the second reason placed betwixt the two Propositions, and before the first Reason; thus in your Letter to Mr. C.

Next, You usurp the license of interpolation, to put in what you please; as when in this Letter you adde the Epithets of natural and necessary to sin.

And thirdly, You take up a strange license in exposition of your Terms; for if you cannot justify what you say, if such a term in your words be taken in the common and

and usual sense : Then you impose upon me an unusual, that I say not a new and unheard of signification thereof. Thus you deal with the word Essential.

And lastly, You assume a *license of contradiction*, to contradict your self, to say and unsay ; one while to make this your meaning, and another time to make that which is contrary your meaning ; and you think that I am obliged to take these contrary meanings to be both your meanings.

Surely Sir, if you can get a Patent for these four Licenses, you will, for matter of Disputation, be shot-free and invulnerable ; your Opponents may throw their caps at you, but not an Argument of theirs can touch you.

Dr. Taylor.

I told you perfectly what is my meaning, it is very plain by the whole design of that, that it must be my meaning, it is also clear enough, and very plain, and very easy in the expression ; and therefore I now appeal to your ingenuity, whether you ought to have made such Tragedies with that, which common sense would have made plain unto you, unless you had received a prejudice.

Jeanes.

As for this triumphant appeal which you make in the close here to my ingenuity, I need say nothing, but refer unto the premises ; onely I cannot but give one Advertisement unto your Disciples, that you sometimes triumph when you have not conquered.

Dr. Taylor.

And now Sir, to your two Syllogisms, be pleased to the subject of the two Majors, add but this qualification [natural] and try if those horrid consequents will follow, which you affixed to your own *quarrel*.

Jeanes.

I have already considered with how little sobriety you have added this Qualification of natural, and, I believe, the impartial Reader will conclude with me, that you have foisted it in upon second thoughts, onely to avoid those horrid consequents, unto which your words in themselves are liable.

Dr. Taylor.

But I shall for this once consider the particulars. 1. You charge it with non-sense ; but with your favor you prove it most pitifully : Your reason is, that to say [Essential] is predicated of [sin] in either of the two ways dicendi per se, is such pitiful and prodigious non-sense, that you think it not worthy of any serious refutation : So that this is your Argument, To say that sin is Essential, is prodigious and pitiful non-sense, therefore it is prodigious and pitiful non-sense.

Surely a good Argument ; or thus, that which is such non-sense that you think not worthy of refutation, is certainly non-sense : But to say that sin is Essential, is such non-sense, that you think not worthy of refutation, therefore it is non-sense. I do not say your Argument is non-sense, but I am sure it is no Argument, unless a bold affirmative be a sufficient proof in your Logic. But to the thing, That sin is Essential, is indeed false to say, but to say so is not non-sense. And whereas you will suppose me to say so, you are

uncharitable, and something unreasonable in it; for I was to prove, That inclination to sin was not a sin of our nature (as was pretended) because what was natural is inviolable and essential, as Docibility to a man: which because to be inclined to sin is not, therefore it is not a sin, viz. of nature.

Jeanes.

First, Here is a gross and egregious falsification of my words, and that without any advantage to your cause: Your reason is, say you, That to say Essential is predicated of sin in either of the two ways, *dicendi per se*, is such pitiful and prodigious nonsense, that you think it not worthy of any serious refutation: Whether these words be justifiable, or no, I need not inquire; for there are no such words in my Paper, neither can you, with all your wit and learning, infer any such matter therefrom.

Secondly, To make sport for your followers, you mis-represent my Argument; and first, clap it into a single Enthymeme, and then into one Syllogism, both of your own forging; in both which you leave out two mediums, that are in my Argument, which reduced unto form, will make up two Syllogisms: To convince you of this unfair, injurious, and disingenuous dealing, I shall insert my words at large. To say (as the Doctor doth by consequence) that sin is essential to the nature of man, is an assertion guilty of nonsense; a thing may be said to be essential to another, *a priori*, and then it is predicated of it in *primo modo dicendi per se*; or else *a posteriori*, and then it is predicated of it in *secundo modo dicendi per se*. And to say that sin is either of these ways essential to the nature of man, is such pitiful and prodigious nonsense, as that I cannot think it worthy of any serious refutation.

The learned Reader will soon perceive how little alliance your Enthymeme and Syllogism have with my Argument; and to him I appeal, to judge of the unworthy and uncharitably injury that you have herein done me; but yet, for the eternal stopping of your mouth, I shall Analyze this my Argument. My conclusion was, that to say (as you do by consequence) that sin is essential unto the nature of man, is an assertion guilty of nonsense; this I prove from a distribution of essential; whatsoever is essential is such, either *a priori*, or *a posteriori*.

But to say that sinne is essential, either *a priori*, or *a posteriori*, is nonsense.

Therefore to say that sin is essential to man, is nonsense.

This Syllogism is grounded upon a known and received Maxime [*Negatis cunctis particulis subiectis totius universalis de aliquo subiecto negatur ipsum to una universale, negatis cunctis membris dividendis, negatur ipsum divisum*]

The major I presumed none would deny, and as for the minor, that I proved from a description of both ways of being essential.

That which is essential to a thing, *a priori*, is predicated of it in *primo modo dicendi per se*; that which is essential to a thing, *a posteriori*, is predicated of it in *secundo modo dicendi per se*.

Now to say that sin is predicated of man, in either *primo*, or *secundo modo dicendi per se*, is nonsense: Therefore to say that sin is essential to man, either *a priori*, or *a posteriori*, is nonsense.

The major I thought undenyable, and as for the minor, here indeed I stopped too in the proof thereof, as thinking all further proof of it needless; because I took it, and still do take it to be, *propositio per se nota*, which needs no proof, but a bare explanation

cation of its terms; *propositio per se nota dicitur; quæ non est nota per aliud*, as Lycheetus; *quæ suis tantum terminis cognoscibilis*, as Collegium Conimbricense gather out of Aristotle; *quæ tales terminos habet, ut ii recte intellectus possint causare evidentem notitiam totius propositionis sine addito*; *omnis propositio hactenus est per se nota, ad quam evidentèr cognoscendum intellectus non postulat aliquod medium, sed solum terminorum penetratione contentus est*, so Scheibl v.

Now, for the terms of the *minor Proposition*: I presumed, that all explication of them was needless unto a Scholar of so great a repute as Dr. Taylor: And therefore, without more ado, I inferred, that to say that sin is either of these ways essential, either *à priori*, or *à posteriori*, is such pitiful and prodigious nonsense, as that I could not think it worthy of any serious refutation. And now Sir, I shall entreat you to review my Argument, being thus truly Analyzed, and I shall appeal unto your conscience, when you are next upon your knees before God, whether you have not deeply wronged me, to represent my Argument thus defectively (that I say not falsely) on purpose, I am afraid, to render it and me ridiculous. Suppose any man should be so absurd, as to say, That a Stone is animal; and I to refute him should thus argue, *Omne animal est aut homo*, who is endued with reason, as well as sense; or *brutum*, which is endued with sense, but not with reason; but to say that a stone is either *homo*, or *brutum*, is such pitiful and prodigious nonsense, as that I cannot think it worthy of any serious refutation. Now he that shall say this is no Argument, but only a bold affirmative, will goe a degree beyond boldness; for 'tis plain, that here are couched and implied two mediums. First, a distribution of *animal in hominem & brutum*: Next, a description of each member of the distribution, and my Argument is exactly parallell'd unto this. But Sir, though I thought, that, before you, I might have spared my labor to prove that 'tis nonsense, to say that sin is essential unto man, either *à priori*, or *à posteriori*; that its predicated of man, either in *primo*, or *secundo modo dicendi per se*; yet, because you seem to blame mine omission of such proof, I shall now give you here in, I hope, sufficient satisfaction.

First, To say that that which is *privative* is *positive*, is nonsense: But to say that sin is essential unto man, either *à priori*, or *à posteriori*, is to say, that that which is *privative* is *positive* (for the *essentials* of man are *positive*, and the *formality* of sin is a *privation*.)

Therefore to say that sin is essential unto man, either *à priori*, or *à posteriori*, is nonsense.

Secondly, To say that that which is predicated of man *per accidens*, is predicated of man in *primo*, or *secundo modo dicendi per se*, is nonsense (because *predicatio per se & per accidens*, are opposite ways of predication.)

But to say that sin is predicated of man in *primo*, or *secundo modo dicendi per se*, is to say, That that which is predicated of man *per accidens*, is predicated of man *per se* (for that sin is predicated of man, *per accidens*, will be questioned by none, who know what *primus modus dicendi per accidens* is.)

Therefore to say that sin is predicated of man in *primo*, or *secundo modo dicendi per se*, is nonsense.

Thirdly, To say that that which is predicated *contingently* of man, is predicated *necessarily* of him, is nonsense.

But to say that sin is predicated of man in *primo*, or *secundo modo dicendi per se*, is to say, That that which is predicated of man *contingently*, is predicated of him *necessarily*, (for sin is predicated of man *contingently*, because man and sin cohere

contingently; man might not have been a sinner, and when he shall not be a sinner, he will still be a man; and then *καθ' αὐτό*, *per se est gradus necessitatis*.

Therefore to say that sinne is predicated of man in *primo*, or *secundo modo dicendi per se*, is nonsense.

If these arguments satisfy you not, you may command more of me when you please, as also any further enlargement of these.

Yea but you say, that *sinne is essentiall* is false to say, but to say so is not nonsense.

To this I answer, that however it may be *sense in Grammar*, yet 'tis nonsense in *Logick*; because 'tis a contradiction; for in *Logick* every contradiction not only *expresse*, but that also which is *virtuall* and *implied* is nonsense, a bull, as we usually speake: thus 'tis nonsense to say that *lignum est servum*; that a spirit is corporeal; that a body is bodiless, without quantity or extension; that an accident subsists; or that a substance properly inhereth.

Now my three arguments above irrefragably prove that, to say that sinne is essentiall to man is a contradiction; for 'tis in effect as much as to say, that that which is *privative* is *positive*; that that which is predicated of man *per accidens*, is predicated of him *per se*; that that which is predicated of man *contingently*, is predicated of man *necessarily*; and these are grosse and palpable contradictions; and therefore not only false, but most pitifull and prodigious nonsense.

You accuse me of uncharitableness, and unreasonableness, in supposing that you say that sinne is essentiall unto man; but from this accusation I have sufficiently vindicated my selfe by beating you from all your miserable shifts; And unto what I have said herein, I shall referre both your selfe and the Reader.

Dr Taylor.

In the next place you charge me this with blasphemy: if I had said or meant what you pretended, you had reason; but then I pray consider how your charge will retorne really upon your selfe; for if it be blasphemy to affirme God to be the Author of sinne, that what I derived from Adam is no sinne; for that Adam's sinne should descend upon me, I demand who was the Author of that? If you please you may take time to consider it; but in the interim if you be pleased to reade a little discourse of mine; called *Deus justificatus*, you shall find my question not to be answered by you; if you have any regard to the authority or to the reason of Mr Calvin, Dr Twisse, and some other of the Bigots of your party.

Jeanes.

1. Here you tempt me to a digression; and you may with as good reason call upon me to answer all the reproaches that *Bellarmino* in this particular, throweth upon the Protestant Churches, and some of the most eminent members thereof, as propound this question unto me.

2. However yet I briefly answer to it, that *Adam* was the author of the descent of his sinne upon me, not God; for to be the Author of sinne is to be a deficient, culpable cause thereof; and it is impossible that God should be defective in a culpable manner; and that our doctrine of originall sinne maketh him to be such, you may boldly affirme, but can never prove.

Bishop

3. *Bishop Davenant* in the doctrine of originall sinne is one of our party; and he speaks that which will abundantly satisfy your demands, in his animadversions upon *Hord* pag. 323. 224. It was not (says he) God's absolute decree of Preterition, but Adam's voluntary act of rebellion, which brought sinne, and the guilt of sinne upon himselfe, and all his posterity, God having justly decreed that Adam's children should participate with him in his state of rightconscience, did as justly decree that they should also participate in the state of sinne.

If this Author deny the propagation of sinne from Adam, he must acknowledge himselfe a Pelagian, &c. His whole discourse concerning originall sinne and the propagating thereof unto all mankind is erroneous, in that he falsely presumeth, that the divine decree must needs be effective or causative of all the events decreed; whereas if the events be actions sinfull, God's decrees are permissive, and ordinative, not decrees of causing, much, esse necessitating such evill actions, as hath been often told him.

4. I have seene your little discourse called *Deus justificatus*; and must say of it as *Florus* did of the *Ligurians*: lib. 2. cap. 3. *Major aliquanto labor erat invenire quam vincere*; The Rhetorick of it is so rank, as that it will be a very hard matter to find out the Logicks and reason that is in it.

If you please to put your arguments into forme, you then may command me to consider them; but otherwise, I shall be very loath to adventure upon any thing of yours; for I find by this present debate about two or three lines, that I shall not without great difficulty search out what is your meaning.

5. I wonder why you say, that by this discourse I shall find your question not to be answered by me; why (pray Sr) could I answer it before you propounded it? but your meaning is, I suppose, that I shall find, that your question cannot be answer'd by me: but the event will try that.

6. That which you meane in Mr *Calvin*, and Dr *Twisse*, are I thinke those places which you quote, pag. 32: of that your discourse; and then unto the place in *Calvin* you have an answer in Dr *Twisse* (vind: gra: lib. 2. dig: 2. cap. 3. pag. 42.) where he clears it from the crimination of *Bellarmino*: And then for the place in Dr *Twisse* you may gather an answer from that he saith unto Mr *Hord*, (pag. 149. 150.) who makes the like objections against him from another place.

7. You are the unmeetest man in the world to upbraid me with the Bigots of my party; for the rigid Zelots of your party, in your doctrine of originall sin, are such whom you may be ashamed to name. Indeed in this point there are very few of your party, save the Pelagians of old, and now the worthy Divines of the *Racovian* denne, and their followers; unto whom the best and the most learned of Protestants will hardly vouchsafe the name of Christians. The Arch-Bishop of Armagh termed them, in a sermon of his (that I heard) a company of baptized Turkes; and indeed Turkes, and Infidels can hardly be greater enemies unto the divine person, and nature of Christ, unto his offices, and unto his great and glorious worke of redemption, and satisfaction, than these wretched miscreants are.

Dr Taylor.

Your second charge of blasphemy is, that my reason does by implication involve Christ in the guilt of sinne; because whatsoever is essentiall he had; but then, If you remember that I say not, that sinne is essentiall; and that I bring the reverse of this very

argument against your party and opinion in some of my late discourses, you have reason to shake the fire out of your own bosome, not to tell me, that I burne; for if inclination to sinne be a sinne naturally and derived from our Parents; I demand whether or no had not Christ all naturall desires? if he had not, he was not a perfect man; If he had then all naturall desires are not naturall sinnes; for if you say they be, you are the blasphemer by the consequence of your affirmative, not I; but God forbid that either of us should.

Jean's.

First, here is no retortion of my argument; for none of my party or opinion hold, that inclination unto evill is essentiall unto man: *Flaccus Illyricus* maintains, that originall sinne was the essence, or substance of the soule; but I never heard that his followers were considerable; he hath (I am sure) both Papists and Protestants; Calvinists, and Lutherans for his opponents: but, perhaps you confound naturall with essentiall, and make them all one; if you doe, your reason will be nothing, but *petitio principii*.

2. I believe, you here play with the equivocation of the word naturall, a thing (though it may be tollerated in a Sophister,) altogether unworthy of a Theologue.

Inclination to sinne may be said to be naturall, either *consequitivè*, or *connexivè*.

That inclination to evill is naturall *consequitivè* (that it flowes, and results Physically, and necessarily from our nature,) I flatly deny: and if you can direct me unto any place in your bookes, where you prove it to be naturall in this sense, I shall take it into consideration. Indeed to say, that it is in this sense naturall, is to throw a reproach upon God the Author of nature.

But it is naturall *connexivè*; together with our nature derived unto us from our first Parents; and yet not in Christ, who had not his nature from Adam in an ordinary way of Generation, but was miraculously conceived by the holy Ghost, and sanctified in the wombe of the Virgin Mary.

This inclination unto evill is a sinful blemish of our nature; because it is a cause of sinne, & *qualis causa talis est effectus*. A good tree, saith our Saviour, cannot bring forth evill fruit, *Matth. 7. 18.* This inclination to evill bringeth forth much evill fruit, and therefore it cannot be good; and consequently it is bad, and sinfull; and therefore could not be in Christ; (who even as man) was the most holy one of God. Indeed if Christ had wanted any propriety of man's nature, he had not then been a perfect man, but, that inclination to evill is a propriety of our nature, *sc: proprium a'q'o modo* you are never able to make good.

But, Sir, in good earnest, doe you thinke that Christ was inclined unto evill? if you doe not, your discourse of Christ is impertinent; if you doe, I shall conclude your opinion to be blasphemous; and unto it shall oppose this following argument.

He in whom dwelled an all-fullnesse of the Godhead bodily; he in whom dwelled an all-fullnesse of habituall grace; he who enjoyed the beatificall vision, was not, could not be inclined unto evill.

But, in Christ dwelled an all-fullnesse of the Godhead bodily; in him also dwelled an all-fullnesse of habituall, and sanctifying grace; he enjoyed the beatificall vision

Therefore he was not, could not be inclined unto evill.

The

The *Minor* will not be denied by any Orthodox Divine, and we may say the same of the *Major*, for, he that shall thinke that the grace of *personall* union, the *all-fullnesse* of *habituall* grace, and the *beatificall vision* are not sufficient to exclude from Christ all inclination unto evil wil render both his learning, & religion too suspected.

But, to put the matter out of doubt, take this following argument for confirmation of the *Major*: there could not be the least inclination unto evil in that person, in whom there was an utter averfenselle from evil in *summo gradu*; (for of contraries, that which is in a remitte degree is not consistent with the other in the highest and most intense degree) but, in that person, in whom there was an *all-fullnesse* of the Godhead, an *all-fullnesse* of *habituall* grace, and the *beatificall vision*, there was an utter averfenselle from evil, and that in *summo gradu*; and therefore impossible that there should be in him an inclination to evil in the least degree.

The Papists extenuate the malignancy of concupiscence as much as may be, affirming that in the regenerate it is no sinne, and that it had been in *Adam* if he had been created in his pure naturalls; yet, they thinke not so well of it, as to ascribe it unto Christ.

Indeed *Durand* is accused for speaking somewhat suspiciously this way; but he is contradicted by the generality of the Schoolemen; * who hold that *some* peccati, concupiscence was neither *actu primo*, nor *secundo* in Christ.

Suarez in
3am par-
tem Thom:
disp. 34.
scilicet. 2.
Greg. de.
Valentia.
Tom. 4. dist.
1. quest.
punct. 3.

1. Not in *actu primo*, and for this they alledge three reasons.
1. The absolute perfection of his virtues, and all-fullnesse of grace.
2. The perpetuall vigilancy, and advertency of his reason.
3. The government of his humane nature, and actions, by his divine and infinite person.

2. Not in *actu secundo*, because in him, the very first motions unto sinne would have been voluntary, and consequently sinfull.

Unto this purpose Becanus, (*Sum: Theolog: Scholast: Tom: 5. cap. 12. quest: 5. pag: 200.*) observeth; that the first motions of concupiscence may be said to be *voluntary* two manner of wayes.

1. Antecedently; when one willingly admits them when he may avoid them.
2. Consequently; when one yeelds consent unto them after they are crept in, in the former way or manner they had been voluntary in Christ; because Christ could have avoided them, by reason of the government of the person of the word; if he had not therefore avoided them, but willingly admitted them, they had in him been blameworthy.

Dr Taylor.

Your third reason also is as pretty; for, first, I demand whether a possibility to sinne be not of the nature of man; (for that is all I meane by essentiall) if it be not; how came *Adam* to sinne his first sinne? if it be, I aske whether shall the Saints in the resurrection be raised up with it or no? If yea; then you blaspheme God's full glorification of the Saints in the resurrection; for impeccability is certainly a part of their full glorification. If nay; then it is no blasphemy to say that in the resurrection the Saints shall be raised up without something that is essentiall to them, or to their nature.

James

JAMES.

That possibility to sinne is essentiall unto every rationall creature I grant; and hereupon inferre, that 'tis not separated from the Saints in their full glorification; neither shall I feare your charge of blasphemy herein, having the generality of Schoolemen, (both Thomists, and Scotists) and reason too on my side. Indeed, the Saints of Heaven do constantly, and interruptedly shun, and decline sinne; yet, 'tis an evill possible unto their nature, considered in it selfe; however they are secured therefrom by their glorified state and condition: for though sinne, and a fullnesse of glory be inconsistent; yet 'tis no contradiction, or repugnancy, that their natures abstractly considered, fecluding the consideration of their glory, should be sinfull. Yea, but you say, impeccability is certainly a part of the full glorification of the Saints; and what is impeccability but an impossibility of sinning; if God then make the Saints impeccable, he takes away from them all possibility of sinning.

For answer.

1. There is a twofold impeccability.

1. By nature. 2. By the grace and gift of God.

Impeccability by nature takes away all possibility of sinning; but it is received generally as a rule among the School-men, that a creature cannot be made *impeccabilis per naturam*, (that is) such a one, as cannot by nature sinne. And, if you please, you may view the proofes thereof in *Capivolus lib. 2. Dist. 22. quest. 1.*

Impeccability by the gift and grace of God doth not eradicate the remote power of sinning; but only keeps it from being actuated; and 'tis this impeccability only, that is part of the Saints glorification.

2. A thing may be said to be impossible, *sensu diviso*, or *sensu composito*.

In *sensu diviso* 'tis not impossible, but possible, for the Saints in Heaven to sin; for that (considered in themselves without the custodient grace of God alwayes underpropping them) they are liable unto sin, the lamentable fall of the Angels of darkenesse is an evident proofe.

But now, *sensu composito*, 'tis indeed impossible for glorified Saints to sinne; and that is; 'tis impossible for them to sinne considered under this *reduplication*, as fully glorified; because fullnesse of glory and sinne cannot stand together. This answer is in Scotus (*lib. 4. dist. 49. quest. 6.*) whose words I shall insert for the sake of some Readers who may not have him in their studies: *Respondeo; patet, quod beatus est impeccabilis in sensu compositionis, hoc est, non potest simul esse beatus, & peccare: sed in sensu divisionis, quod inuens beatus non habeat potentiam & possibilitatem ad peccandum potest intelligi dupliciter: vel per aliquid sibi intrinsicum, quod excludit potentiam talem; vel per causam extrinsecam, quod excludit potentiam propinquam ab illo, &c: nulla est causa intrinseca in voluntate Michaelis nunc beati, per quam excludatur potentia ad peccandum pro aliis, in sensu divisionis, non est autem causa intrinseca prohibens istam potentiam omnino reduci ad actum: sed per causam extrinsecam est impossibilis potentia illa propinqua ad peccandum, videlicet per voluntatem Dei praecedentem illam voluntatem, ut semper continet actum fruendi, & ita nunquam possit potentiam suam remitti non fruendi, vel peccandi, reducere ad actum: siquidem nunquam causa secunda praevota à causa superiori agente ad unum oppositum potest potentia propinqua exire in aliud oppositum. Concedo ergo, quod inferi, quod Michael*

chael beatus, & sit peccabilis in sensu divisionis loquendo de potentia remota.

Dr. Taylor.

But Sir, what think you of Mortality? is that essential, or of the nature of man? I suppose you will not deny it. But yet I also believe you will confess, that though we are sown a corruptible body, yet we shall be raised an incorruptible, and the mortal shall put on immortality.

Ieanes.

For answer, I shall propound a distinction of mortality, that is very obvious and ordinary. A thing may be said to be mortal, either respectu potentiae remotae, or respectu potentiae propinquae.

1. In respect of a remote power of dying, which hath in it the remote cause of dissolution, an elementary matter.

2. In regard of a near power of dying, arising from the actual conflict, and correlative influence of the Elements, and their contrary qualities.

The latter Mortality is separable, but then it is not essential.

As for the former Mortality, which alone is essential, I think very few doubt, but that 'tis also inseparable from the nature of a mans body: for, the immortality and incorruption of the bodies of the Saints in the resurrection, will not be by taking away out of their bodies the remote causes of corruption, the Elements, and their contrary qualities, (for, then their bodies would not be mixt; and so not for substance the same that they were) but by an hinderance or prevention of the correlative influence of the Elements, and their contrary qualities.

That I am not singular in this, I shall manifest, by transcribing the Testimonies of some few School-men, who though they differ one from another in assigning the cause and reason of the impassibility and incorruptibility of glorified Bodies; yet they all agree with Durand in this, That glorified Bodies are not impassible, per privationem potentiae passivae, sed per aliquod praestans impedimentum actualis passionis ne fiat.

The first shall be of Scotus, (lib. 4. dist. 49. quest. 13.) Dico ergo quod causa impassibilitatis est voluntas divina non coagens causa secundae corruptivae, & per hoc, est illud impassibile, non potentia remota, sed propinqua, non à causa intrinseca, sed extrinseca impediens, sicut dictum est de impeccabilitate supra, &c. exemplum huius de igne in camino, qui non egit ad consumptionem trium puerorum, non quidem per aliquam impassibilitatem intrinsecam pueris, nec ex carentia potentiae passivae, nec ex contrario intrinseco impediens, sed quia Deus ex voluntate sua non cooperabatur ad illam actionem.

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nam inherenter, sed solum per virtutem divinam assistentem beatis ad naturam & prohibentem actionem cuiuscunque extrinseci inferentis passionem.

This latter way *Divand* takes himself, and endeavoreth to confirm it by three Reasons.

The third shall be of *Suarez*, (in tertiam part: Thom: disp: 48. p. 531.) nam licet in corpore glorioso maneat eadem materia, idemque temperamentum ex qualitatibus contrariis, inde solum fit corpus illud in nuda natura sua consideratum, esse corruptibile, & in beatitudine retinere quasi causam remotam, seu naturalem radicem corruptionis: nihilominus tamen secundum proximam dispositionem intrinsecam esse incorruptibile & impossibile: quia affectum est alia quadam perfectione quæ ex se potest impedire, nè illa naturalis corruptibilitas in actum reducatur.

Dr. Taylor.

Once more, Is it natural to be a natural? that will not be denied: But then remember, that although to be natural is essential, that is, of the essence of the body, yet the natural shall arise without its naturality; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual.

James.

1. That that which is natural, is natural, will not be denied, as you say; but 'tis *propositio ideatica nugax*, a most trifling Tautology: and unto what purpose you propound a question concerning it, I know not.

2. Of things natural unto man, some are natural powers, some are natural acts: Natural (first) powers may be and are essential unto the body; and so they are inseparable too; our Bodies, when they shall be raised, shall not want so much as one such natural power: But natural acts are accidental, and in the resurrection there may be no place for the exercise of, at least, some of them, viz. Generation, Nutrition, and the like; as touching such things, we shall be like the angels in Heaven, as it were spiritual.

3. In the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15. 44. it is not *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, a natural body, but *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, an animal or souly body, that is, actuated and animated by the soul after a natural way and manner, by the intervention of bodily helps, such as eating, drinking, sleeping, and the like. And in all congruence of opposition hereunto, a glorious body is said to be a spiritual, in regard of an immediate supportance by the spirit, without any corporeal means, and without any use of the generative and nutritive faculties.

Dr. Taylor.

So that you see, if I had said this which you charge upon me, which is contrary to my thoughts, and so against my purpose, yet your Arguments could not have overthrown it.

James.

Whether you do not here boast, and triumph without a victory, I am very well contented to refer it unto the learned Reader.

Since my penning of my exceptions, sent unto Mr. C. I have read the Metaphysics of Dr. Robert Baro, that learned Scot; and in them I find the like of these three

three last Arguments of mine, urged against the error of Flaccius Illyricus; that Original Sin is of the substance of man, and essential to him after the fall, a proposition subalternate unto that which I charge you with; his words are as followeth, *Prima opinio damanda & à nostris Theologis & a Pontificis de naturâ peccati originalis est absurdissima heresis Illyrici, statuentis peccatum originale esse de substantia hominis, seu esse quid homini essentiale post lapsum, contra quam sententiam Bellarminus disputans, varias affert rationes: præcipue hæ sunt, Primò, si peccatum esset pars substantiæ humanæ, aut Deus erit author peccati, quippe qui substantias omnes creavit, aut si quis neget illam substantiam esse à Deo, cogetur sateri eam esse à Diabolo, qui est author peccati; necessarium enim est, ut habeat aliquam causam, at utrumque consequens est absurdum, ergo & antecedens: Secundò, aut Christus non assumpsit naturam humanam integram, aut peccato non caruit, quorum utrumque est absurdum: Tertio, Ad diem judicii natura hominis resurget, & æternam vitam possidebit, saltem quoad electus: Peccatum verò tum nullum erit in glorificatis, ergo peccatum non est quid essentialis, sed quid separabile est ab ipsâ naturâ, pag. 248, 249: These reasons differ so little from mine, as that you may think perhaps that I have borrowed mine from either Bellarmine or Euseb, which yet I assure you I did not: The reason why now I recite these Reasons, is to shew, that my arguments are not such weak and pitifull things, but that very Learned Men have made use of the like, to disprove a proposition subordinate unto that which I goe about to refute,*

Dr. Taylor.

It is good advice ἡ ἡγεμονία καὶ βοήθεια τοῦ ἀντιμαχόμενου, if you had been pleased to have learned my meaning before you had published your dislike, I should have esteemed myself obliged to you in a great acknowledgement.

Jeanes.

Your advice out of Aristophanes, I like very well; I am not conscious unto my self that I have towards you transgressed against it: for before I uttered a syllable of dislike, I used my best endeavor to finde out what was your meaning, and to that purpose, made use of that little Logick and Reason which I had; and as for that meaning which I affix unto your words, let the Reader determine, whether I have violated any rule of Logick or Reason, in imputing it unto you: What I took to be your sense, together with my Objections against it, I sent unto Mr. C. to be transmitted speedily unto you, exposing all unto the utmost severity of your examination; and wherein I have here trespassed against charity or justice, I would fain know.

Besides, my dislike I expressed onely in a private place, before very few, in private discourse, and I have not hitherto published it, from either Press or Pulpit.

Dr. Taylor.

Now you have said very much evil of me, though I deserve it not.

Jeanes.

This I deny, and flatly challenge you to prove what you aver.

G g g 2

Dr. Taylor.

Dr. Taylor.

For suppose I had not prosperously enough expressed my meaning, yet you, who are a man of wit and parts, could easily have discerned my purpose and my design: You could not but know, and consider too, that my great design was to say, That sin could not be natural, that it is so far from being essential, that it is not so much as subjected in our common natures, but in our persons only.

I answer.

1. Whether what you say of my wit and parts, be not a scem, I shall not trouble myself to inquire, but leave it unto your conscience: However, I suppose, you think your self far superior unto my poor self in wit and parts, and I also readily acknowledge as much: Now I wonder why you should think that I should so easily finde out what is your meaning, seeing you (whose abilities so far transcend mine) be so unprosperous, not onely in the expression, but in the after interpretation of your meaning, as that you dissent in a latter Letter, from your self in a former Letter: How can you reasonably expect that I, who am not (as one of your Profelites lately said) worthy to be named the same day with you, (I shall not deny the truth of the comparison, nor envy you the honor thereof) should (as the Proverb is) see further into a Mill-stone then you, who are so Eagle and quick sighted.

Secondly, Whereas you say, That sin is not so much as subjected in our common nature, but in our persons only; I doubt that I understand you not, for to me it seems very evident, that sin, (so far as a privation can be inherent) is truly inherent in our natures; for it hath all the Requisites of inherence, that Aristotle layeth down (Categor: cap. 2.)

1. It is in our nature.

2. Not as a part of our nature.

3. Neither can it exist sever'd and apart from our natures: Sin is seated in all individuals of our nature, whilst living here upon earth, Christ his humanity alone excepted; and therefore why may not we say, that 'tis subjected in our common nature? Seeing those accidents are seated secundarily, and mediately in second substances, which are primarily and immediately placed in their respective first substances; substantiæ secundæ substant accidentibus gratia primarum.

Yea, but you will (perhaps) say, it is subjected in our persons only, therefore not in our nature: But this is a very sorry Objection: For who knows not the distinction of *subjectum*, in *subjectum quo*, & *quod*; our persons only are *subjectum quod* of sin, our natures notwithstanding may be *subjectum quo* of it; and we may say the same of other accidents. I finde you (pag. 494.) quoting that usual Axiome, *actiones sunt suppositorum*; but, if you had considered the limitations that are usually given thereof, you would have spared the urging of it: *actio est suppositi* (saith Scotus) *ultimate denominati ab actione, sed non ut solius denominati ab ipsi*: But you may have some deep meaning, which I fathome not; fair leave may you take to explain your self.

Dr. Taylor.

Dr. Taylor.

But besides this, Sir, I am a little to complain of you, that when you had two words at your choice to explicate each other (*intrinsic*, and *essential*) you would take the hardest and the worst sense, not the easiest and most ready.

Leaves.

I have here given you, not only no cause, but not so much as any shadow or colour for complaint.

1. I gave a reason why I insisted on the word *essential* only, and passed by the term *intrinsic*; because you use *intrinsic* as equivalent unto *essential*, as is apparent, by your opposing it unto *accidental*: And have you said, can you say any thing to the contrary.

2. I would fain know why you should say that *essential* is a harder word then *intrinsic*; there is, I am sure, that equivocation in the word *intrinsic*, which is not in the word *essential*; for, that which is *accidental*, may be *intrinsic*; there being *intrinsic*, as well as *extrinsic* accidents; *internum & externum* (say Philosophers) *sumuntur, vel ratione essentie, vel ratione loci, & subiecti*.

Dr. Taylor.

For you cannot but know, that *essential* is not always to be taken in the strictest sense of Philosophy, for that which is constitutive of a nature; but largely, and for all sorts of properties, and the universal accidents of nature.

Leaves.

The distinction of *essential*, into that which is such *constitutive*, as constituting the essence, or that which is such, *consequentivè*, as necessarily resulting from the essence, I very well know: and I grant the proprieties which are such, *quarto modo*, which agree *omni, soli, semper*, are in this latter sense said to be *essential*; but that *essential* is ever taken, as you say, for all sorts of proprieties, those which are such, *primo, secundo, or tertio modo*, is notoriously false, for then *essential* would be taken for that which is most *accidental*; but let us examine your instances.

Dr. Taylor.

As it is *essential* to a man to laugh, to be capable of learning, to be mortal, to have a body of contrary qualities, and consequently by nature corruptible.

Leaves.

If you should affirm in the publick Schools of either of the Universities, that to laugh is *essential* to man, you would not only be laughed, but hissed, and houted at: the gross and palpable absurdity of this your Assertion, I thus prove.

Nothing that is *accidental* to man, can be said to be *essential* to him.

But to laugh is *accidental* to man,

There-

Therefore it is not essentiall.

The *Major* is apparent from the opposition, that you your selfe make betwixt essentiall, and accidental.

The *Minor* is thus confirmed.

That which is predicated of man *contingently*, is accidental to man.

But to laugh is predicated of man contingently.

Therefore it is accidental to man.

The *Major* is plain, because contingency of predication is one of the chief things which distinguisheth *accidens predicabile*, from all other predicables, and it is a reciprocal character thereof.

And for the *Minor*, that is no lesse evident: indeed *visibile* is essentiall unto man, and predicated of him in *secundo modo dicendi per se*; but *ridere* to laugh is accidental, because it is predicated of man *contingently*; for a man and actuall laughter cohere *contingently*: the lowest degree of necessity in affirmative and essential predication, is *de omni*; and *de omni posteriorisficum*, requireth *universitatem temporis* as well as *subiecti*; that is, *propositio recta prout debet esse semper vera*; now all men do not alwayes laugh, and therefore laughter is predicated of man contingently, and consequently accidental to him.

You see, Sir, I am bold to trouble you, ever and anon, with my trifling Logick, and you can expect no other, as long as you thus trespass against what is most trivial and obvious in Logick, the very *A. B. C.* thereof.

2. As for the second instance, you bring capacity of learning: that is taken for *potentia prima*, or *secunda*.

1. If it be taken for *potentia prima*, then it immediately flowes from the soule, and is essentiall to man, *consequitur*, as a *proprium 4to modo* of man, and so 'tis inseparable from him; but, if taken for *potentia secunda*, so it ariseth from the disposition of the temper and organs of the body, and is not essentiall, but accidental, and separable from man.

As for the third, to be mortal, I have already spoken of that sufficiently.

As for the 4th instance, to have a body of contrary qualities is essentiall *consequitur*, and a *posteriori* unto an essentiall predicate of man; viz: a mixt body; and so is essentiall unto man, and predicated of him in *secundo modo dicendi per se*, as a mixt body is predicated of him *primo modo dicendi per se*. For, as Scheibler [*de propcap. 4. n. 41.*] sheweth, *ad predicationes per se secundi modi pertinent non solum predicationes ille, in quibus proprium predicatur de subiecto suo primo, veluti corpus est quantum, sed etiam ille predicationes in quibus proprium predicatur de speciebus sui primi subiecti, veluti homo est quantus*: but this hath no alliance with laughing, for it agreth alwayes unto all men.

Dr. Taylor.

And in a morall discourse to call for Metaphysicall significations, and not to be content with morall and generall, may proceed from an itch to quarrell, but not from that ingenuity, which will be your and my best ornament.

Jeanes.

It hath hitherto been a receiv'd rule amongst all Logicians ; that in *mist questions*, the termes of which belong unto severall disciplines, we must for the explication of each terme, have recourse unto the discipline, unto which it appertaineth; and you can say nothing to disprove this rule : whether inclination to evil will be essentiall to man? is a mixt question; for *inclination to evil or sine*, is a Theologicall terme, and *essentiall*, is a Metaphysicall terme; and therefore, in taking it in a Metaphysicall sense, I have done nothing, but what Logick, and reason have prescribed me; and therefore I shall not feare your passionate, and irrationall censure of me for it. To cleare this yet further by instancing in mixt propositions of the like nature; *an formale peccati in genere sit privatio rectitudinis debite rationali creature? an formale peccati originalis sit solum privatio originalis justitie? an pronitas ad malum fluat ex principiis naturæ integræ? an Sacramentum sit eius respectivum? an Sacramenta sint causæ Physicæ gratiæ?*

Now if here you should be pleased to say, that in these questions to call for Metaphysicall significations, of *privatio*, *principium*, *eius respectivum*, and *causa Physicæ*, may proceed from an itch to quarrell, but not from that ingenuity, which will be our best ornament, you will bewray but little judgment, and lesse ingenuity.

2. If that, which you call essentiall in a *morall*, and *large sense*, doe not either constitute the essence, or necessarily flow therefrom, it will in the upshot prove to be but accidentall; and how then comes it that you oppose it unto accidentall? But you will, perhaps, tell me, that I must take accidentall in a *morall*, and *large sense*, as well as essentiall; But, Sir, what is there in your words to guide me unto this sense of accidentall? I took accidentall for the concrete of *accidens prædicabile*, and so I believe have most Schollars that have read you; and why it should not be thus understood I thinke you can alledge no reason, but that, you know not otherwise to make any tolerable sense of your words: your discourse is Polemicall; and if therein you use Philosophicall termes, and I call for a Philosophicall signification of the termes, with what forehead can you accuse me for being quarrelsome, and disingenuous? if when you cannot defend what you say, according unto the proper, and usuall signification of the words you use, you must have liberty to fly unto large and unusuall senses of them, you may say even what you please; for no man will be able to understand what you say, unless he hath a peculiar key unto your writings,

But let us inquire what can be here meant by accidentall in a *morall* and *large sense*: essentially, you say, in a *morall sense*, is that which is not after our nature, but together with it; and, in conformity hereunto, accidentall in a *morall sense* must be that which is after our nature, and not together with it, and then I shall desire you to awake, and consider, whether your *second reason* be not coincident with your *third*; for your second reason, as you expound it, stands thus; *inclination to evil is after our nature, and not together with it in reall being*: And your *third reason* is this, *inclination to evil is superinduc'd unto nature, and is after it, &c.*

Dr Taylor.

Although I have not much to doe with it, yet because you are so great a Logician, and so great an admirer of that which every one of your Pupils knows, I mean Porphyries definition of an accident, I care not if I tell you that the definition is imperfect and false.

Jeames.

1. You have ever and anon an uncivil sting at my poor Logicks; But, Sir, let me be so bold as to tell you, that as my Logick is the object of your contempt, so that my Pupils cannot find in that Logick, which you manifest in these your papers, matter for either their envy or emulation.

2. Why, pray Sir, doe you say, that I am so great an admirer of Porphyries definition of an accident? indeed I say, that 'tis a celebrated definition of an accident; but thereby I signify only that 'tis frequently and much used, commonly known, and in every man's mouth; and this acception of the word is usuall in Cicero, as these instances following evidence: *Celebratus omnium sermone letitiaque convivium: hoc delatum est tum ad eos pontifices, post omnium sermone celebratum, quoniamadmodum iste omnia fecit: quod ita esse constanti fama atque omnium sermone celebratum est: quid porro in graeco sermone tam tritum atque celebratum est quam, &c.*

3. Though you care not to tell me, that Porphyries definition of an accident is false, and imperfect; yet you should have been carefull to have brought stronger objections against it, than those you have urged, for they containe such grosse, and absurd untruths, as that every one that understands them, will think you a very incompetent judge of the definitions of Porphyrie and Aristotle. Indeed how faire you are to seek in the nature of accidents, appears by your talking of accidents constitutive of a substance, in your discourse of the Real-presence, &c: (Self. 11. num: 12: pag: 209.) but let us heare your objections.

Dr Taylor.

It is not convertible with the definition; for even, essential things may be taken away sine interitu subjecti.

Jeames.

For an answer unto this, I shall referre you to your selfe, in your book, but now mentioned of the Real-presence of Christ in the holy Sacrament. (Self. 11. num. 30. p. 244. & 245.) God can doe what he pleaseth, and he can reverse the lawes of his whole creation, because he can change or annihilate every creature, or alter the manners and essences; but the question now is, what lawes God hath already established, and whether or no essentials can be changed, the things remaining the same? that is, whether they can be the same, when they are not the same? he that sayes God can give to a body all the essential properties of a spirit, saies true, and confesses God's Omnipotency; but he sayes also that God can change a body, from being a body to become a spirit; but if he sayes, that remaining a body it can receive, the essentials of a spirit, he does not confesse God's omnipotency, but makes the Article difficult to be believed, by making it not to work wisely and possibly: God can doe althings, but are they madnes, when they are done? that is, are the things changed in their essentials and

and yet remaine the same? then how are they chang'd, and then what hath God done to them?

But to come unto your instances,

Dr. Taylor.

1. Instance to be quant'ative is essential to a body, and to have succession of duration; but yet in the resurrection when bodies shall be spiritual, and eternal, those other which are now essential predicates shall be taken away, & yet the subject remain, & be improved to higher, and more noble predicates.

Jeanes.

1. As for the 1. of these instances it is without doubt, that to be quantitative is essentiall unto a body *a posteriori*, and *consecutive* as a *proyrium* thereof *qto modo*, but.

1. That quantity is separable from a body was never affirmed by any besides the Patrons of either transubstantiation or consubstantiation.

2. If a body were without quantity, it would be without extension, and so would exist in an undivisible point without distinction of parts, and so it would be *συνεκλικόν*, a bodiless body, which is a flat contradiction.

But for refutation of this, I shall referre you to your own selfe in your discourse of the Real-presence, &c. (Sect. 11. 13 pag. 211.) But I demand, when we speak of a body what we mean by it? for in all discourses and entercourses of mankind by words, we must agree concerning each others meaning: when we speak of a body, of a substance, of an accident, what does man-kind agree to mean by these words? all the Philosophers and all the wise men in the world, when they speak of a body, and separate it from a spirit, they mean, that a spirit is that which hath no material divisible parts Physically that which hath nothing of that which makes a body that is extension & limitation by lines and superficies. And, (Pag. 212.) when we speak of a body all the world meanes that, which hath a finite quantity. Pag. 219. 220: that which I now insist upon is, that in a body there cannot be indistinction of parts, but each must possess his own portion, or place, and if it does not, a body cannot be a body. Sect. 11, num. 18. Again, (Pag. 221. num. 20: ejusd: Sect:) If Christ's body be in the Sacrament according to the manner of a substance not of a body; I demand according to the nature of what substance whether of a material or an immaterial? if according to the nature of a material substance, then it is commensurate by the dimensions of quantity, which he is now endeavouring to avoid. If according to the nature of an immaterial substance, then it is not a body, but a spirit, or else the body may have the being of a spirit, whilst it remains a body, that is, be a body, and not a body at the same time.

Here every material substance, by your opinion is commensurate by the division of quantity, and therefore no material substance can be without the dimensions of of quantity; afterwards in (pag. 241. & 242. num. 29. ejusd: Sect:) you bring in a shift of Bellarmine unto which you returne a very good answer, both which I shall transcribe. Bellarmine says that to be coextended to a place is separable from a magnitude or body, because it is a thing that is extrinsecal and consequent to the intrinsecal extension of parts, and being later than it, is by divine power separable: but this

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is as very a sophism as all the rest; for if whatever in nature is later than the substance, be separable from it, than fire may be without heat, or water without moisture; a man can be without time, for that also is in nature after his essence, and he may be without a faculty of will, or understanding, or of affections, or of growing to his state, or being nourished, and then he will be a strange man, who will neither have the power of will, or understanding, or desiring, or avoiding, of nourishment or growth, or any thing, that can distinguish him from a beast, or a tree, or a stone; for these are all later than the essence, for they are all essential emanations from it, thus also quantity can be separated from a substantial body if every thing that is later than the forme can be separated from it.

When you wrote this, you thought it a grosse absurdity to averre that quantity could be separated from a substantial body; when you have answered your selfe, I shall then take up the Cudgels, and reply unto your answer in the mean while, I shall consider your argument by which you endeavour to prove quantity separable from a body.

It stands thus; in the resurrection bodies shall be spiritual; therefore to be quantitative, which is now an essential predicate, shall be then taken away.

For answer.

1. If the bodies of the Saints shall be raised without quantity, then without extension, without integral parts, without heads, eyes, armes, legs, feet, and this would be a very pretty, and proper resurrection; it would indeed be an invisible resurrection; this is a very strange, and false assertion, contrary as to the constant tenor of both ancient, and moderne Divinity, so also unto expresse scripture; *In my flesh, saies Job, shall I see God, whom I shall see for my selfe, and my eyes shall behold, and not another*, Job. 19. 26, 27: the bodies of the Saints shall in the resurrection be conformed unto Christ's glorious body in his: Philip 3. 21: and that was a visible and palpable body, it might be seen and felt, it had flesh and bones, and hands, feet and sides, Luk. 24. 39, 40: John. 20. 27: see Aquin: *sum: ad 3^{am} part. sum: 8^o: quest. 80. Art. 1.* Tertullian upon these words of the Apostles [*this corruptible shall put on incorruption*] hath this glosse, *quantitativam & eandem numero essentiam digito demonstrat, magis enim expresse loqui non poterat, nisi eutem sum manibus tenebat.*

2. As for the spirituality of our bodies in the resurrection, that shall not be destructive of their quantity; for they shall be spiritual, not in regard of substance; but in respect of either immediate supportance by the spirit, or else resemblance unto a spirit.

1. In respect of immediate supportance by the spirit without the help of bodily means, meates, drinks, sleep, medicaments, &c: he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his spirit that dwelleth in you, Rom. 8. 11: or else

2. (As others conjecture) in regard of resemblance unto a spirit as touching some particulars in the resurrection; they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the Angels of God in Heaven, Matth. 22. 30.

But that spirituality of the body in Paul's sense of the word is no impeachment unto the quantity of it is evident enough from what you say in your treatise of the Real-presence, &c: for therein you rightly averre, that Christ's body is now a spiritual body, and yet maintain against the Papists that 'tis endued with quantity, and hath *partem extra partem*, one part without the other answering to the parts of his place.

Your second instance is, to have succession of duration, this is essential to a body think you yet in the resurrection, when our bodies shall be eternal, it shall be taken away.

But

But here Sir, my poor Pupils, because you are so great a Metaphysician, care not much if they tell you, That *succession* in duration is so far from being essential to a body, as that it doth not at all agree thereunto; and they have learnt it out of Scheibler, *Metap. lib. 1. cap. 16. n. 48. 53. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. cap. 19. n. 9. 10. 11. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.* And *Saurez, disp. 50. Sect. 5. and 7.* Metaphysicians no ways inferior unto your great self.

Out of them they thus argue, whatsoever hath a successive duration, hath also a successive essence or being; but now no body hath a successive essence or being, therefore no body hath a successive duration.

The *Major* is evident, because as *Saurez* and *Scheibler* well prove, the duration of a thing is not distinguished from the actual existence thereof, *velly*, but only *ratione ratiocinata*.

And then for the *Minor*, it may be thus confirmed, Whatsoever hath a successive essence or being, hath the parts of its essence in *fluxu*, so that 'tis partly past, partly present, and in part to come; but no such thing can be affirm'd of any body, and therefore no body hath a successive essence or being.

Or thus, No permanent being hath a successive being or essence; but every body is a permanent being, therefore no body hath a successive being or essence.

The *Minor*, that alone asks proof, may be thus confirmed: Whatsoever hath all the parts of its essence or being together (so that in no moment of time there is wanting unto it any thing requisite unto its essential integrity) that is a permanent being; but every body hath all the parts of its essence or being together (so that in no moment of time there is wanting unto it any thing requisite unto its essential integrity.)

Therefore every body is a permanent being.

If you should say, That God only hath permanency of being, according to that of the Psalmist, *Psal. 102. 26. 27. The Heavens shall perish, but thou shalt endure; yea all of them shall wax old, like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed, but thou art the same.*

Unto this they will answer, That you do but trifle with the equivocation of the word *permanency*, it is (they will say) opposed unto either *mutability* or *succession*; if it be opposed unto *mutability* and *defectibility* of being, then God alone hath permanency of being; but if it be opposed unto *succession* of being, then every created being, besides motion, hath permanency of being; and this *Scheibler* hath taught them, *Met. lib. 1. cap. 19. n. 35. Nulle rei (inquit) convenit fluxus vel successio partium essentialium præterquam motui (permisive loquendo) unde non est successivum, nisi tempus quo durat ipse motus: nempe sicut essentia motus consistit in successione partium: ita etiam duratio motus consistit in successione partium, & proinde utrumque est ens successivum, si tamen a parte rei loquamur, tum solum unum ens est successivum, nempe motus, duratio enim motus à parte rei eadem est cum essentia ipsa.* If you should say with *Bonaventure*, and others, That succession of duration distinguisheth the creature from the Creator, and therefore every creature hath succession of duration: They will again (out of the forementioned Authors) distinguish of a two-fold succession, *privative* and *positive*.

1. A *privative* or *negative* succession, and that is, either betwixt not being, and being, or betwixt being, and not being; thus when a man is begotten, his being succeeds his not being, and when he dies, his not being succeeds his being; and this *privative* succession doth distinguish the creature from the Creator, and therefore doth or may agree to every creature: for even the Angels had a beginning,

and so there was a succession of their being unto their not being ; and they might have an end, by Gods omnipotency, if he had not decreed otherwise : nay, God could annihilate them merely by the withdrawing of his preservative influence, and so there might have been a succession of their not being unto their being : this succession is *opposed* unto an intrinsic necessity of existence, or unto an immutable permanency, *seu stabilitati permanentiæ*, as Suarez phraseth it, *Disp: 50. Sect. 5. n. 26.* and not unto *permanency of being as such* : This succession, if we speak of the power and capacity of it, is essential to our bodies, and withal, 'tis inseparable from them ; for even after the resurrection, God could (if he had not determined the contrary) reduce them unto their first nothing.

A *positive succession* hath for both its extremes a positive being, and this is again (they will say) either *discrete*, or *continuous*.

1. *Discrete* between beings, totally perfect ; as the knowledge of one Plant succeeds the knowledge of another Plant : But this succession doth not constitute a successive being.

There is another succession, which they call *continuous*, and that is not betwixt total beings, but betwixt parts of the same being ; when they do not exist together, but one after another, in *fluxu* (as they say) and this succession is proper and peculiar unto motion, though not unto every motion. Thus far my Pupils.

Dr. Taylor.

This I have here set down, not that I at all value the problem whether it be so or no, but that you may not think me a Socinian particularly in this Article, or that I think the bodies in the resurrection shall be specifically distinct from what they are here ; I believe them the same bodies, but enabled in their very beings, for to a specific and substantial change, is required, that there be introduction of new forms.

Jeans.

1. You will not be thoroughly and sufficiently distinguished from the Socinians in this Article, if you think the bodies in the resurrection shall be *numerically* distinct from what they are here ; and therefore I shall intreat you to tell us in your next, how far you accord with or dissent from them in this particular.

2. You here say, that to be quantitative, shall be taken away from our bodies in the resurrection ; and the sequel of this is, that bodies in the resurrection shall be *specifically* distinct from what they are here ; for a quantitative substance, and a substance without quantity, are specifically distinct ; because the one is material, a body, and the other immaterial, a spirit, and not a body at all, unless *nomine tenus*.

Dr. Taylor.

But yet the improving of essential predicates, is no specification of subjects, but a memorization of the first.

Jeanes.

The ordinary Reader may perhaps think, that there is some great mystery wrapt up under these hard words ; but the plain meaning of them, is (as I suppose) that the

the improving of essential predicates, doth not make a specifical change of subjects, but onely advance a subject unto a better being. Essential predicates may be said to be improved three manner of ways. 1. By *abolition of them*. 2. By *intension of them*. 3. By *addition unto them*.

The two latter are impertinent to this business in hand; for suppose (though not grant) that the essential predicates of substances might be improved by *intension* of them, or by *addition* unto them; yet what will this make to the separability of essentials from a subject: The improving of essential predicates, that belongs unto our present purpose, is by *abolition* of them, and by substituting new and more noble essentials in their room; and that essentials may be abolished, and new essentials substituted in their rooms (the things remaining the same) is a thing you may *magisterially* and *imperiously* dictate, but can never *Scholastically* prove.

But (perhaps) you will say, that you take essential in a Moral and Theological sense: But Sir, you must remember, that you are not to take *essential* here, in such a latitude, as to include *accidental* and *contingent predicates*; for if you should, Porphyry's definition of Accidens will remain unshaken by what you say: Would not this be a ridiculous Argument? accidental and contingent predicates may be taken away, *sine subjecti interitu*, therefore *adesse & abesse sine subjecti interitu*, is no excellent definition of an accident; and yet this will be your very argument, if by essential predicates you mean any thing besides the *four first predicables*, unto which all essential predicates are reducible.

Dr. Taylor.

But the consequent is, that *abesse & adesse sine subjecti interitu*, is not an excellent definition of an accident.

James.

The arguments from which you infer this consequent, are overthrown, and therefore this consequent falleth to the ground of it self, without you support it by some self arguments.

Dr. Taylor.

And yet further, it follows; That if *sin* were as essential to a man, as *mortality* is, or to be *quintitative*, yet there is no more need that man should rise with *sin*, then with *mortality*.

James.

And, pray Sir, why do not you adde, and with quantity? Do you begin to startle at this Proposition? that men shall rise without quantity: But as touching the separability of both mortality and quantity from bodies in the resurrection, I have spoken already so fully, as that I may spare to say any thing anew of it.

Dr. Taylor.

But Aristotles Philosophy, and Porphyry's Commentary, are but ill measures in Theology, and you should do well to scour bright that armor in which you trust, which unless it be prudently conducted, will make a man a Sophister rather then a Theologue: but you are wiser.

James.

Jeanes.

Aristotle and Porphyry are no contemptible Authors in Philosophy; but who ever thought them infallible in Philosophy, or their Books measures in Theology? Philosophy is a very usefull Hand-maid unto Divinity, and none will decry it, but such whose sayings and writings cannot endure the test thereof; nothing that is true in Philosophy, can be false in Divinity; for *verum vero non opponitur*, one truth doth not, cannot clash with another: As for my Philosophy, I hope God will preserve me from trusting in it, or in any other arm of flesh: If you can detect any error therein, I shall be ready to retract it, and be very thankful to you for your pains; as for the dirt you have hitherto thrown thereon, it will not stick, but recoileth on your own face.

Dr Taylor.

I have only this one thing to adde, That the common Discourses of Original Sin, makes sin to be natural, necessary, and unavoidable, and then may I not use your own words, this Tenet is chargeable with Libertinism, it is a licentious Doctrine, and opens a gap to the greatest prophaneness, for it takes away all conscience of sin, all repentance of it for the time past; if sin be natural, necessary, and unavoidable, as it is to us, if we derive it from Adam, &c. what reason hath he to be humbled for it, and to ask God pardon for it: so that you have done well against your own opinion; and if I had not used the argument before, I should have had reason to thank you for it: now as it is, you are further to consider of it, not I.

Jeanes.

If you understand by *natural*, that which *naturally* results from nature, and by *necessary* and *unavoidable*, that which is *denominated* such from a primitive and created necessity, that which you say is a foul slander against the common discourses of Protestants against Original sin: But if you mean by *natural* that which is *connexed with*, and *coeval* unto our nature, and by *necessary* and *unavoidable*, that which is such in regard of a *consequent and contracted necessity*, it will be nothing to the purpose: for you (and you may take in to boot your good friends of *Racovia*) are never able to prove, that the assertion of such a naturality and necessity of Original sin, is any bar to humiliation or repentance for it, unto Prayer for the pardon of it.

Dr Taylor.

Sir, Though I have reason to give you the priority in every thing else, yet in civility I have far out-done you.

Jeanes.

First, You have written a Letter to me without a Supercription, and I have returned one unto you with a Supercription; and this I take, to be of the two, the greater civility.

If I may believe the echo of the neighborhood, you have written several Letters unto Mr. T. C. concerning me, that cannot pretend to any great civility, for they are said to be stuffed with insulting reproaches: unto which I shall return nothing, but my Prayers for the increase of your charity and humility.

Dr. Taylor.

Dr. Taylor.

You were offended at a passage, which you might easily, but would not understand; you have urg'd arguments against me, which return upon your own head: The Proposition you charge me withall, I own not in any of your senses, nor (as you set it down) in any at all, and yet your arguments do not substantially, or rationally confute it, if I had said so.

Jeanes.

Here you sum up your Conquests, but whether you do not reckon without your Host, let the Reader judge.

Dr. Taylor.

Besides all this, you have used your pleasure upon me; you have reviled me, slighted me, scorned me, untempted, unprovoked; you never sent to me civilly to give you satisfaction in your Objections, but talked it my absence, and to my prejudice.

Jeanes.

Unto all this, a general negative is a sufficient answer, until I know the Particulars that your Delator hath informed you with; but perhaps, you may think that for such an obscure person as myself, to dare to except against what you write, is to revile, slight, and scorn you; if you be so impatient of contradiction, I shall leave it unto your own bosom to judge from what spirit it proceeds: When you published your Book, you exposed it to every mans censure that would read it; and will you accuse every man of uncivility that passeth his censure upon any passage in it, in a private discourse with friends? But Sir, upon Mr. C. his entreaty, I sent him in writing the reasons that I had for my censure, and these reasons were by my consent to be conveyed to you, and therefore I sent unto you *mediately* by another to give satisfaction to my objections: If you shall say that 'twas uncivil for me not to make my address immediately unto your self, it is a charge will easily be wiped off; I was, as I thought, an utter stranger unto you, and Mr. C. professed a greet acquaintance with, and interest in you, and assured me that my Exceptions should be received with all possible candor, and promised his diligence and fidelity in conveying of them unto you; my objections therefore were sent civilly unto you, though sent by him; but however you are thus severe, the Reader, I hope, will have a more charitable opinion of my procedure herein, and think, that you have no reason to make such Tragical Out-crys against me for abusive uncivilities towards you.

Dr. Taylor.

Yet I have sent you an answer, I hope, satisfactory, and together with it a long Letter, which in the midst of my many affairs and straitned condition, is more then I can again afford.

Jeanes.

Unto your long Letter I have returned a longer answer; and whether yours or mine be satisfactory, I am contented to refer it unto the indifferent Reader: If your condition be straitned, I wish it were more plentiful: But my affairs are, I believe, neither for number nor importance inferior unto yours; and from them I have borrowed so much time, as to answer you, and shall be ready to do so again to perform unto you the like office.

Dr. Taylor.

Letters of the Author

Dr Taylor.

And after all this, I assure you that I will pray for you, and speak such good things of you, as I can finde, or hear to be in you; and profess my self, and really be, Sir, Your affectionate friend and servant, in our blessed Lord and Saviour Jesus. Jer: Taylor.

Jeames.

For this your promise I give you hearty thanks, and shall endeavor to make you as grateful a return as I can, in the like Christian offices of love, and so shall rest,
In Christ Jesus your humble servant, Henry Jeames.

POSTSCRIPT.

Dr Taylor.

Sir, I received yours late last night; and I have returned you this early in the morning, that I might in every thing be respective of you.

Jeames.

This I easily believe, and am confident, that upon review of your Letter you will acknowledge, that according to the proverb, you have made more haste then good speed.

Dr. Taylor.

But I desire not to be troubled with any thing that is not very material, for I have business of much greater concernment; neither can I draw the saw of contention with any man about things less pertinent. I expect no answer, I need none, I desire none, but expect that you will employ your good parts in any thing, rather then in being ingenious in alieno libro. Your talents can better (if you please) serve God, then by cavilling with or without reason.

Jeames.

Whether or no the controversie between us be not material, but less pertinent; whether your Letter be so satisfactory, as that it needs no answer? as also, whether I cavill without reason (to cavil with reason, is a Catachresis as harsh as *ratione insinative*, and as hardly justifiable, but by a *licentiâ poeticâ*) are things in which I refuse you for my Judge, and appeal unto the learned and unprejudic'd Reader.

Secondly, That you neither expect nor desire an answer from me may be very probable, but that I was obliged to return you one, I have 3 Reasons that convince me.

First, By my silence, the truth which you have wronged would suffer.

Secondly, your Papers have been with a great deal of diligence published, and if I should not give them an answer, I should be accessory to the Funeral of my own good name. And

Thirdly, A friend of yours, when he gave me this your Letter, told me, That I could not answer it, and that you were, as he thought, infallible: now I thought it my duty to undeceive him, who having your person in too great an admiration, greedily swalloweth whatsoever falls from your pen, though never so false and erroneous.

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